英文翻訳をお願いします。
Admiral Keyes thought that the operation was doomed to fail and Admiral Jellicoe expected a great success. Despite the demands of the battles at Ypres, Haig had kept XV Corps on the coast throughout, ready to exploit a German general withdrawal. Haig resisted suggestions to launch the operation independently, wanting it to be synchronised with the advance on Roulers, which loomed in early October but did not occur until a year later. Prior and Wilson wrote that the amphibious part of the plan was extremely risky, given the slow speed of the monitors and un-armoured pontoons. A German mobile force was on hand as a precaution and the area could be flooded. In 2008, J. P. Harris wrote that the German spoiling attack demonstrated that the decline of the German armies in France has been exaggerated and that the War Cabinet had neglected to question Haig more rigorously, after he assured them that the reverse had been due to local factors. In 1997, A. Wiest called the plan an imaginative way to return to a war of movement, foreshadowing the amphibious warfare of World War II and a credit to Haig but his refusal to agree to a landing independent of events at Ypres, showed that he had overestimated the possibility of a German collapse. On 11 July Rawlinson ordered that lost ground be recovered by outflanking the new German line along the canal in the Dunes sector. The XV Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Du Cane noted that instant counter-attacks made by local initiative usually succeeded, while those ordered later by higher authority were too late to exploit disorganisation among the attackers and that adequate preparation and a methodical attack was necessary.
補足
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