次の英文を訳して下さい。
The French government accepted that the task facing Joffre and the army was far more difficult than expected, after the winter fighting in Artois and Champagne. Despite costly mistakes, many lessons had been learned, methods had been changed and more weapons and equipment necessary for siege warfare had been delivered. The offensives had failed in their objectives but had become more powerful and better organised, except for the bungled effort at St. Mihiel. The greater amount of heavy artillery gave grounds for confidence, that further attacks could break the German front and liberate France.
In late 1914, General Erich Von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff of the German army Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) since 14 September, had reinforced the 4th Army and attacked westwards, parallel to the North Sea coast, culminating in the Battle of the Yser (16–31 October 1914) and the First Battle of Ypres (19 October – 22 November), when open warfare in the west ended. Eight new divisions were formed in February 1915 and another fourteen in April, which were formed into a new 11th Army, intended for an offensive in France. Despite the French battle in Champagne in February, Falkenhayn was forced to cancel his plans to attack in the west and send the 11th Army to the Eastern Front, to support the Austro-Hungarian army, which has suffered more than 2,000,000 casualties by March 1915. Nine divisions were transferred to Russia in May, which reduced the Westheer (Western Army) to 97 divisions against 110–112 larger French, British and Belgian divisions. The Westheer had c. 4,000 modern and 350 obsolete field guns, 825 modern and 510 obsolete heavy guns and ten super-heavy howitzers. A reserve of 276 heavy guns and mortars was also being prepared. OHL had 7
1⁄2 divisions in reserve, with the 58th and 115th divisions behind the 6th Army. Indications of an attack in Artois had been detected but not signs of a general offensive on the Western Front.
The Westheer was forced to remain on the defensive, except for limited attacks in Flanders, in the Second Battle of Ypres (21 April – 25 May) and in the Argonne west of Verdun until August, to cut the main rail line from Paris to Verdun. In memoranda issued on 7 and 25 January 1915, Falkenhayn ordered that the positions of the German armies in France were to be fortified to resist attacks with only small forces, to enable reserves to be sent to Russia. Should part of the front line be lost, it was to be retaken by counter-attack. Behind the line, new defences were to be built and connected by communication trenches, to delay a further attack, until reserves could be assembled for a counter-attack. Enemy reinforcements were to be obstructed by a shell-barrage (Geschoss-schleier). On 4 May, Falkenhayn reiterated the need to improve reserve positions and also to build a rear position about 1.2–1.9 mi (2–3 km) behind the front line.
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