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Owing to a failure to co-ordinate timings, the field artillery preparation of the forward positions ceased at 04:23, although the naval guns continued to engage some of the depth targets. While the original plan had been for the attack to begin as soon as the artillery had stopped, local commanders did not adjust their plans following the early cutoff of preparatory fires and the attack was not launched until the appointed time of 04:30. After the artillery firing ceased, no-one in the assaulting force knew if the bombardment was to continue. It was later discovered that the synchronisation of watches between the artillery officer and the assault officer was overlooked.[54] As the attack was not launched as soon as the bombardment ceased, but instead held back until the planned time of 04:30, the Ottoman defenders had ample time to return to their trenches – which were largely undamaged – and prepare for the assault that they now knew was coming. The first wave of 150 men from the 8th Light Horse Regiment, led by their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Henry White, "hopped the bags" and went over the top. They were met with a hail of machine gun and rifle fire and, within 30 seconds, White and all of his men were gunned down. A few men reached the Ottoman trenches, where they began to hurl grenades and marker flags were reportedly seen flying around the south-eastern corner of the Ottoman trench line, but the men were quickly overwhelmed by the Ottoman defenders. At this stage, the futility of the effort became clear to those in the second wave and, according to Carlyon, the attack should have been called off at this point. The second wave of 150 followed the first without question two minutes later and met the same fate, almost all the men being cut down by heavy rifle and machine gun fire before they got halfway to the Ottoman trench. This contrasted with the simultaneous attack by the 2nd Light Horse Regiment (1st Light Horse Brigade) at Quinn's Post, against the Ottoman trench system known as "The Chessboard", which was abandoned after 49 out of the 50 men in the first wave became casualties. In this case, the regiment's commander had not gone in the first wave and so was able to make the decision to cancel further attacks. As the third wave, consisting of men from the 10th Light Horse Regiment, began assembling in the forward trench, two Ottoman field artillery pieces began firing into no man's land. Lieutenant Colonel Noel Brazier, commander of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, attempted to have the third wave cancelled. He was unable to find Hughes – who had moved to an observation post– and instead found Antill. A strong personality, Antill exerted a large amount of influence within Hughes' command, and had a personal dislike of Brazier, who he felt was being insubordinate in questioning orders. Antill had received the reports that marker flags, implying success, had been sighted. This report of marker flags was subsequently confirmed in a Turkish article published after the war, where it was stated by the commander of the Turkish 27th Regiment that a couple of men with a marker flag reached the Ottoman trench and raised the flag, but were killed. Antill had not checked the scene to establish if it was of any use to send the next wave, nor did he confirm if the marker flags were still in place, and after heated words with Brazier issued the order for the third wave to proceed without referring the matter to Hughes. Without being able to speak to Godley, who was at his headquarters on the beach, Brazier returned to the forward Australian position at Russell's Top and gave the order for the third wave to attack, telling them "Sorry, lads, but the order is to go".
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- furamanko
- ベストアンサー率27% (565/2056)
タイミングの調整がうまくいかなかったため、野戦砲による前方陣地の準備は4時23分に終了したが、海軍砲はいくつかの深さの目標を攻撃し続けた。 当初の計画では砲撃が停止した時点で攻撃を開始する予定であったが、準備射撃が早期に打ち切られたことを受けて現地の指揮官は計画を調整せず、攻撃が開始されたのは定刻の4時30分であった。 砲撃が止まった後、砲撃が継続されるかどうかは突撃隊の誰にもわからなかった。砲兵将校と突撃将校の時計の同期が見落とされていたことが後に判明した[54]。 砲撃が止んでもすぐには攻撃が開始されず、予定されていた04:30まで延期されたため、オスマン軍の守備隊は、ほとんど被害を受けていない自分たちの塹壕に戻り、来ることがわかっていた突撃に備えるための十分な時間があった。 隊長のアレクサンダー・ヘンリー・ホワイト中佐が率いる第8軽騎兵連隊の150名の第一陣は、「バッグを飛び越えて」頂上に向かった。彼らは機関銃とライフル銃の雨に見舞われ、30秒後にはホワイトと彼の部下全員が銃殺された。オスマン軍の塹壕に到達した数人の兵士は、手榴弾を投げ始め、オスマン軍の塹壕線の南東の角にマーカーフラッグが飛んでいるのが目撃されたと言われていますが、彼らはすぐにオスマン軍の守備隊に圧倒されてしまいました。この段階で、第2陣の兵士たちは努力の無駄を悟り、カーライオンによれば、この時点で攻撃を中止すべきだったという。 第1波に続いて2分後、150名の第2波も同じ運命をたどった。オスマン軍の塹壕にたどり着く前に、ライフルや機関銃の激しい射撃を受けて、ほぼ全員が戦死した。これと対照的なのが、クインズ・ポストでの第2軽騎兵連隊(第1軽騎兵旅団)による「チェスボード」と呼ばれるオスマン帝国の塹壕システムへの同時攻撃で、第1波の50人中49人が死傷した後に放棄された。この場合、連隊長は第1波に参加していなかったので、それ以上の攻撃を中止する判断を下すことができた。第10軽騎兵連隊からなる第3波が前方の塹壕に集合し始めたとき、オスマン軍の野砲2門が無人地帯に向けて発射し始めた。第10軽騎兵連隊長ノエル・ブラジエ中佐は、第3波を中止させようとした。観察所に移動していたヒューズを見つけられず、代わりにアンチルを見つけたのだ。強烈な個性の持ち主であるアンティルは、ヒューズの指揮下で大きな影響力を持ち、命令に疑問を持つ反抗的な態度をとるブラジエを個人的に嫌っていた。アンチルは、成功を意味する標示旗を見たという報告を受けていた。この標示旗の報告は、その後、戦後に発表されたトルコの記事で確認された。そこには、トルコ第27連隊の司令官が、標示旗を持った数人の兵士がオスマン軍の塹壕に到達して旗を掲げたが、殺されたと記述されていた。アンティルは、次の波を送るのに役立つかどうかを現場で確認しておらず、標示旗がまだ残っているかどうかも確認しておらず、ブレイジャーと激しい言葉を交わした後、ヒューズに照会することなく、第3波の進行命令を出したのである。浜辺の司令部にいたゴドリーと話すことができないまま、ブラジエはラッセルズ・トップのオーストラリア軍前方陣地に戻り、「すまない、若者たち、しかし命令は出発だ」と言って第3波に攻撃命令を出した。