英文翻訳をお願いします。

質問

Late on 20 August General Karl von Bülow, the 2nd Army commander, who had tactical control over the 1st Army while north of the Sambre, held the view that an encounter with the British was unlikely and wished to concentrate on the French units reported between Charleroi and Namur, on the south bank of the Sambre; reconnaissance in the afternoon failed to reveal the strength or intentions of the French. The 2nd Army was ordered to reach a line from Binch, Fontaine-l'Eveque and the Sambre next day to assist the 3rd Army across the Meuse by advancing south of the Sambre on 23 August. The 1st Army was instructed to be ready to cover Brussels and Antwerp to the north and Maubeuge to the south-west. Kluck and the 1st Army staff expected to meet British troops, probably through Lille, which made a wheel to the south premature. Kluck wanted to advance to the south-west to maintain freedom of manuoeuvre and on 21 August, attempted to persuade Bülow to allow the 1st Army to continue its manoeuvre. Bülow refused and ordered the 1st Army to isolate Maubeuge and support the right flank of the 2nd Army, by advancing to a line from Lessines to Soignies, while the III and IV Reserve corps remained in the north, to protect the rear of the army from Belgian operations southwards from Antwerp.

回答No.1

Nakay702 · ベストアンサー

＞Late on 20 August General Karl von Bülow, the 2nd Army commander, who had tactical control over the 1st Army while north of the Sambre, held the view that an encounter with the British was unlikely and wished to concentrate on the French units reported between Charleroi and Namur, on the south bank of the Sambre; reconnaissance in the afternoon failed to reveal the strength or intentions of the French.
⇒8月20日遅くに、第２方面軍指揮官のカール・フォン・ビュロー将軍は、サンブル川の北では英国軍との出会いがありそうもないという見方を持ち、サンブル川の南岸でシャルルロアとナミュールの間にあると報告されたフランス部隊に集中することを望んで、第１方面軍の戦術を統制しようとした。しかし午後の偵察調査で、フランス軍の軍力や意図は明らかにならなかった。

＞The 2nd Army was ordered to reach a line from Binch, Fontaine-l'Eveque and the Sambre next day to assist the 3rd Army across the Meuse by advancing south of the Sambre on 23 August. The 1st Army was instructed to be ready to cover Brussels and Antwerp to the north and Maubeuge to the south-west. Kluck and the 1st Army staff expected to meet British troops, probably through Lille, which made a wheel to the south premature.
⇒翌日、第２方面軍は、8月23日にサンブル川の南を進軍することによってミューズ川の全域で第３方面軍を支援するために、ビンシ、フォンテーヌ-レヴェック、サンブル川からの戦線に接触するよう命令された。第１方面軍は、北のブリュッセルとアントワープ、南西のモベージュをカバーする準備を整えておくように命じられた。クルックと第１方面軍の参謀は、おそらくリール経由のイギリス軍と対戦すると思っていたので、南への旋回を早まってしまった。

＞Kluck wanted to advance to the south-west to maintain freedom of manuoeuvre and on 21 August, attempted to persuade Bülow to allow the 1st Army to continue its manoeuvre. Bülow refused and ordered the 1st Army to isolate Maubeuge and support the right flank of the 2nd Army, by advancing to a line from Lessines to Soignies, while the III and IV Reserve corps remained in the north, to protect the rear of the army from Belgian operations southwards from Antwerp.
⇒クルックは、機動作戦の自由を守るために南西への進軍を望み、8月21日に、第１方面軍がその機動作戦を続けることを認めるようビュローを説得しようとした。ビュローはそれを拒否して、（第１方面軍の）第III、第IV予備軍団が、アントワープから南進するベルギー軍の作戦活動から当該方面軍の後部を保護するため北に残る間に、モベージュを孤立させてルシーヌからソワニーへの戦線へ進軍することによって第２方面軍の右側部を支持するよう第１方面軍に命じた。

お礼

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