翻訳お願いします。
Were the observer, whether casual or skilled, to reside for some length of time in an asylum, and thus to make himself practically acquainted with the ways, thoughts, and feelings of its inmates, he would certainly discover how great a mistake it is to suppose, as is often done, that they are always so alienated from themselves and from their kind as not to be influenced by the same motives as sane persons [are influenced] in what they do or forbear to do. When an insane person is on his trial for some criminal offence, it is commonly taken for granted by the lawyers that if an ordinary motive for the act, such as anger, revenge, jealousy, or any other passion, can be discovered, there is no ground to allege insanity, or, at any rate, no ground to allege exemption from responsibility by reason of insanity. The ideal madman whom the law creates is supposed to act without motives, or from such motives at it enters not into the mind of a sane person to conceive; and if some one, who is plainly mad to all the world, acts from an ordinary motive in the perpetration of an offence, he is presumed to have acted sanely and with full capacity of responsibility. No greater mistake could well be made. Much of the success of the modern humane treatment of insanity rests upon the recognition of two principles: first, that the insane have like passions with those who are not insane, and are restrained from doing wrong, and constrained to do right, by the same motives which have the same effects in sane persons; secondly, that these motives are only effective within limits, and that beyond these limits they become powerless, the hope of reward being of no avail, and the expectation or infliction of punishment actually provoking more unreason and violence.
お礼
ありがとうございます。