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質問

Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft had been burdened with too many duties, in bad weather. The three-week pause originated from lieutenant-generals T. Morland and W. Birdwood, the X and I Anzac corps commanders, at a conference of 27 August. The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn of 29 August, which described the multi-layered creeping barrage and the use of Fuze 106, to avoid adding more craters to the ground. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests to decide when zero hour should be set; the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks, were discussed with Plumer on 15 September. X Corps issued its first Instruction on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions.
A pattern for British attacks was established and Second Army orders and artillery instructions became routine, with an Attack Map showing stages of attack and timetable for the corps involved; corps moves and the time of attack were briefly noted. Nine divisions were to attack on a 10,000 yd (9,100 m) front; the Second Army had three times and the Fifth Army twice the ammunition than for Pilckem Ridge. In late August, destructive fire by super-heavy artillery began and counter-battery fire commenced in early September, in poor visibility. The RFC plan incorporated standardised methods used by battery commanders and artillery observation crews, as informal liaison methods had been found to be insufficient with the increase in the amount of artillery and aircraft in the BEF since 1915. Wireless codes were harmonised and better training introduced for air–ground liaison. Attacks were to be made on German billets, railways, aerodromes and infantry counter-attacks. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) contributed 26 squadrons, including the two night-bombing squadrons and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) Handley-Pages from Coudekerque, beginning the night before the attack.

回答No.1

Nakay702 · ベストアンサー

＞Aircraft were reserved for systematic counter-attack reconnaissance, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft had been burdened with too many duties, in bad weather. The three-week pause originated from lieutenant-generals T. Morland and W. Birdwood, the X and I Anzac corps commanders, at a conference of 27 August.
⇒航空機については、悪い天候の中で少ない航空機が非常に多くの義務を負った前の戦いの失敗を避けるために、体系的な反撃調査が用意された。アンザック第X、第1軍団の司令官、T.モーランドとW.バードウッド両中将の、8月27日の会談から3週間の休止が提起された。

＞The attacking corps made their plans within the framework of the Second Army plan, using General Principles on Which the Artillery Plan Will be Drawn of 29 August, which described the multi-layered creeping barrage and the use of Fuze 106, to avoid adding more craters to the ground. The Second Army and both corps did visibility tests to decide when zero hour should be set; the use of wireless and gun-carrying tanks, were discussed with Plumer on 15 September. X Corps issued its first Instruction on 1 September, giving times and boundaries to its divisions.
⇒攻撃軍団は、「8月29日の砲兵隊計画が引き出される基盤となる一般原則」を使って、第2方面軍の計画の枠組内で計画を立てた。それ（一般原則）は、地面に砲弾痕を追加することを避けるために纏いつく集中砲火や106番信管などの多重使用を説明して（戒めて）いた。第2方面軍および両軍団は、開始時間をいつに設定すべきかについて視認テストをした。無線機および大砲付戦車の使用が9月15日にプルーマーと議論された。第X軍団は、9月1日、最初の指令を出して、所属の諸師団に予定時間と、相互間の境界線について指定した。
※この段落、訳文に自信ありません。誤訳の節はどうぞ悪しからず。

＞A pattern for British attacks was established and Second Army orders and artillery instructions became routine, with an Attack Map showing stages of attack and timetable for the corps involved; corps moves and the time of attack were briefly noted. Nine divisions were to attack on a 10,000 yd (9,100 m) front; the Second Army had three times and the Fifth Army twice the ammunition than for Pilckem Ridge.
⇒英国軍攻撃のためのパターンが設定されて、第2方面軍司令と砲兵隊指令は、関係する軍団のための攻撃の段階と時刻表の「攻撃マップ」がルーチン（定番）になった。軍団の動きと攻撃の時間が簡潔に注記された。9個師団が10,000ヤード（9,100m）の前線を攻撃することになっていた。ピルケム・リッジの場合に比べて、第2方面軍は3倍の、第5方面軍は2倍の弾薬を備えた。

＞In late August, destructive fire by super-heavy artillery began and counter-battery fire commenced in early September, in poor visibility. The RFC plan incorporated standardised methods used by battery commanders and artillery observation crews, as informal liaison methods had been found to be insufficient with the increase in the amount of artillery and aircraft in the BEF since 1915.
⇒8月末に、超重砲による破壊的な砲火が始まり、9月初めの貧弱な視界の中で反砲撃砲火が開始された。RFC（英国王立空軍）計画は、砲兵隊司令官と砲兵隊観察乗員によって使われ、規格化された方法を組み入れたが、それは、1915年以来BEF（英国遠征軍）における大砲と航空機の量の増加によって、非公式な連絡方法では不十分であると判明したからであった。

＞Wireless codes were harmonised and better training introduced for air–ground liaison. Attacks were to be made on German billets, railways, aerodromes and infantry counter-attacks. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) contributed 26 squadrons, including the two night-bombing squadrons and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) Handley-Pages from Coudekerque, beginning the night before the attack.
⇒上空－地上の連絡のために無線コードが揃えられて、よりよいトレーニングが導入された。攻撃は、ドイツの民家、鉄道、飛行場、および歩兵反撃に対して行われることになっていた。英国王立航空隊（RFC）は、26個の航空大隊を寄与（負担）したが、それには2個の夜間爆撃大隊、およびクーデケルクから来た英国海軍航空隊（RNAS）のハンドリー‐ページ社機（重爆撃用の4発機）が含まれていて、攻撃の前の夜間爆撃が開始された。

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回答ありがとうございました。