和訳をお願いします。

質問

On mobilization, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian soldiers would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader but it would also need fortifications for defence, which were on the frontier. A school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment in line with French theories of the offensive. Belgian plans became a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur.
German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906 devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications, with an offensive on the northern flank which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory.

回答No.1

Nakay702 · ベストアンサー

＞On mobilization, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian soldiers would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader but it would also need fortifications for defence, which were on the frontier. A school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment in line with French theories of the offensive. Belgian plans became a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur.
⇒兵士動員に関しては、国王が総司令官になって、方面軍を集結させるべき場所を選んだ。新しい再軍備計画の混乱の中で、まとまりもなく訓練経験も貧弱な兵士としては、侵入者との接触が遅くなる中央配属の恩恵に与りたいところであったが、国境沿いにある防衛要塞の強化要員も必要だった。攻撃に関するフランス的兵法理論に沿って、（もっぱら）前線への布陣体制への復帰を望む一派もあった。ベルギー軍の作戦としては、野戦軍はゲテ川後方に集結し、リエージュとナミュール前方に２個師団を配備する、という折衷案となった。

＞German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906 devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications, with an offensive on the northern flank which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory.
⇒ドイツ軍の戦略は、1891年以降フランスに対しては攻撃作戦を、ロシアに対しては防御体制を優先した。数的劣勢、移動と集結の速度、および近代兵器の膨大な増加の影響などによってドイツ軍の計画が決定づけられた。ドイツ軍にとって正面からの攻撃は、特にフランス軍とロシア軍がドイツとの前線で防備を現代化したあとは、費用高と長期戦が予想され、限定的な戦果しかあげられなくなるに至った。1891–1906年在任のドイツ帝国総司令官（Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL"「参謀統帥」）アルフレッド・フォン・シュリーフェンは、フランス軍の強化前線を避け、地域の数的優勢があって迅速かつ決定的な勝利が得られそうな、北部側面を攻撃する計画を考案した。

お礼

回答ありがとうございました。