German Troops Under Attack: British Aircraft Strikes Low| OKWAVE

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A brigade of the 58th Division, (XVIII Corps) was to attack up Gravenstafel spur towards Aviatik Farm. The relief of V Corps by II Anzac Corps, to bring the ridge as far north as Passchendaele into the Second Army area was delayed, as the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions were still battleworthy. German defensive preparations Main articles: 4th Army defensive changes: September–November 1917 and Action of 25 September 1917 Tower Hamlets spur overlooked the ground south towards Zandvoorde. The upper valleys of the Reutelbeek and Polygonebeek further north commanded the German counter-attack assembly areas in the low ground north of the Menin road. The large mound in Polygon Wood, the Butte de Polygone gave observation of the east end of the Gheluvelt Plateau towards Becelaere and Broodseinde and had been fortified with machine gun emplacements and barbed wire obstacles. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions, the front position, Albrecht Stellung (second position), Wilhelm Stellung (third position), Flandern I Stellung (fourth position), Flandern II Stellung (fifth position) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction). In between the German defence positions lay the Belgian villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. The German defences had been arranged as a "forward zone", "main battle zone" and "rearward battle zone". Polygon Wood formed part of the Wilhelmstellung; large numbers of dugouts and foxholes were constructed within it. After the defeat of 20 September, the 4th Army made changes to its defensive methods. At a conference on 22 September, it was decided to increase the artillery effort between battles, half for counter-battery fire and half against British infantry. The accuracy of German artillery fire was to be improved by increasing the amount of artillery observation available to direct fire during British attacks. Infantry raiding was to be stepped up and counter-attacks to be made more quickly.

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Companies of the support battalions were located at the back of the forward zone with half in the pillboxes of the Albrecht Stellung. Dispersed in front of the Albrecht Stellung were divisional sharpshooter machine-gun nests. The Albrecht Stellung marked the front of the main zone with the Wilhelm Stellung (third line), located a further 2,000 yards (1,800 m) away, marking the rear of the main zone. This zone contained most of the field artillery supporting the front divisions. In pillboxes of the Wilhelm Stellung were reserve battalions of the front-line regiments in divisional reserve. The rearward zone, located between the Wilhelm Stellung and the Flandern I Stellung, contained the support and reserve assembly areas for the Eingreif divisions. The German failures at the Battle of Verdun in December 1916 and at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 had given more importance to these areas, since the forward zones had been overrun and the garrisons lost. It was anticipated that the main defensive engagement would take place in the main battle zone, against attackers who had been slowed and depleted by the forward garrisons, reinforced if need be by the Eingreif divisions. The Germans planned a rigid defence of the front system and forward zone supported by counter-attacks. Local withdrawals according to the concept of elastic defence, was rejected by Lossberg the new 4th Army Chief of Staff, who believed that they would disorganise troops moving forward to counter-attack. Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters, which were man traps but evacuate them as soon as the battle began and move forward and to the flanks to avoid British fire and to counter-attack. A small number of machine-gun nests and permanent garrisons were separate from the counter-attack organisation, to provide a framework for the re-establishment of defence in depth once an attack had been repulsed. German infantry equipment had recently been improved by the arrival of thirty-six MG08/15 machine-guns per regiment, which gave German units more means for fire and manoeuvre.

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After dawn, aerodromes were periodically to be attacked by small formations of low-flying fighters and by day bombers from high-altitude. German defensive preparations Main article: German defensive preparations: June–July 1917 From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions the front position, Albrechtstellung (second position), Wilhemstellung (third position), Flandern I Stellung (fourth position), Flandern II Stellung (fifth position) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction). Between the German defence positions, lay the Belgian villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. "Elastic" defence tactics had been rejected by the 4th Army Chief of Staff, Major-General Fritz von Loßberg, who believed that a tactical withdrawal by trench garrisons would disorganise the counter-attacking reserves, leading to the loss of the sector and danger to flanking units. Loßberg ordered the front line of sentry groups (Postengraben) to be held rigidly; British attacks would exhaust themselves and then be repulsed by local German reserves or by Eingreif divisions. Loßberg also judged that there was little prospect of British attacks being delayed by their need to move artillery forward and build supply routes. The British had a huge mass of artillery and the infrastructure necessary to supply it with ammunition, much of it built opposite the Flandern I Stellung in the period between the attack at Messines and 31 July. German defensive tactics had been costly but succeeded on the front of XIX Corps on 31 July and against II Corps on the Gheluvelt Plateau on 31 July and during August, although the counter-attacks had been stopped in their turn by British artillery fire, when they reached areas where observation and communications between British infantry and artillery had been restored. Ludendorff later wrote that losses in the August battles had been unexpectedly high. The pause in British operations in early September helped to mislead the Germans. General von Kuhl (Chief of Staff, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht) doubted that the offensive had ended but by 13 September had changed his mind.

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Charbonneau explained that the defeat of the Colonial Corps was caused by faulty reconnaissance, the ineffectiveness of advanced guards in causing delay to advancing German units and that French offensive tactics neglected the importance of obtaining a superiority of fire, which had led to reckless attacks. The quality of the German opponents was not mentioned but German reconnaissance had been effective, communication between commanders and subordinates had not broken down, mutual support between neighbouring units had occurred and German artillery had provided continuous close fire support. At Neufchâteau, the French colonial infantry had been out-gunned and outnumbered by German units, which had been able to engage all their forces quickly. The French XII Corps had a greater number of guns but was not able to overcome two German infantry battalions. German artillery had engaged the Colonial Brigade from close range but when in a hastily occupied defensive position, the French had nullified much of the German artillery-fire; French troops caught in the open had been annihilated. Both sides had attempted to gain fire superiority before advancing and once this had been achieved by the Germans, they had been able to manoeuvre without severe casualties

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Dispersed in front of the line were divisional sharpshooter (Scharfschützen) machine-gun nests called the Stützpunkt-Linie. Much of the Kampffeld north of the Ypres–Roulers railway, had fallen on 31 July.The Albrecht Stellung (second line) roughly corresponded to the British black line (second objective) of 31 July, much of which had been captured, except on the Gheluvelt plateau. The line marked the front of the main battle zone (Grosskampffeld), which was about 2,500 yd (2,300 m) deep, behind which was the Wilhelm Stellung (third line) and most of the field artillery of the front divisions. In pillboxes of the Wilhelm Stellung were the reserve battalions of the front-line regiments. The leading regiment of an Eingreif division was to advance into the zone of the front division, with its other two regiments moving forward in close support, from support and reserve assembly areas, further back in the Flandern Stellung. Eingreif divisions were accommodated 9,800–12,000 yd (9,000–11,000 m) behind the front line and at the beginning of an attack, began their advance to assembly areas in the rückwärtige Kampffeld behind Flandern I Stellung, ready to intervene in the Grosskampffeld, for den sofortigen Gegenstoss (the instant-immediate counter-thrust). In an appreciation of 2 August, Group Ypres correctly identified the Wilhelm Stellung as the British objective on 31 July and predicted more attacks on the Gheluvelt plateau and further north towards Langemarck. In the Group Ypres area, only the 3rd and 79th Reserve divisions remained battle worthy, the other four having suffered c. 10,000 casualties. On 4 August, a Group Wijtschate assessment concluded that the British attack needed to make progress, by forcing back the 52nd Division on the Gheluvelt plateau, where the defensive scheme had the front regiment of each division backed by the other two regiments in support and in reserve behind the front line. Crown Prince Rupprecht expressed concern on 5 August, that the weather conditions were rapidly exhausting the German infantry.

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The advance was to be by bounds to objective lines behind a creeping barrage moving at 90 m (98 yd) every four minutes, with pauses to make sure that the French barrage kept pace with the British barrage. The first objective was the two German lines east of the Yser Canal and the second objective was the German third line. A total advance of 5,000 yards (4,600 m) to the red line was not fundamental to the plan, being an attempt to provide enough discretion to the divisional commanders to make local advances without the need to request permission, based on the extent of local German resistance, in accordance with the manual SS 135. This was intended to avoid situations that had occurred in previous offensives, when vacant ground had not been promptly occupied and had then to be fought for in later attacks. Had the German defence collapsed and the red line been reached, the German Flandern I, II and III Stellungen would have been intact, except for Flandern I Stellung for a mile south of Broodseinde. On 10 August, II Corps was required to reach the black line of 31 July, an advance of 400–900 yards (370–820 m) and at the Battle of Langemarck on 16 August, the Fifth Army was to advance 1,500 yards (1,400 m). The German 4th Army operation order for the defensive battle was issued on 27 June. The German 4th Army had about 600 aircraft of the Luftstreitkräfte, 200 being single-seat fighters; eventually eighty German air units operated over the Flanders front. German defences had been arranged as a forward zone, main battle zone and rearward battle zone. The defence in depth began with a front system of three breastworks each about 200 yards (180 m) apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion, with listening-posts in no man's land. About 2,000 yards (1,800 m) behind these works was the Albrecht Stellung (second line), a secondary or artillery protective line that marked the rear boundary of the forward zone.

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The defensive power of the German Eingreif Divisions had been underestimated and the attacking divisions, having easily advanced for 1 mi (1.6 km) in three hours, had been exposed to observed machine-gun and artillery-fire for the rest of the day, most of the British casualties being incurred after the advance. The postponements of the attack prolonged the preliminary bombardment for six days and wet ground, particularly in the Bassevillebeeek, Hanebeek and Steeenbeek valleys had become crater-fields that filled with water when it rained. The German artillery concentration behind the Gheluvelt Plateau had been most effective against the artillery of the II and XIX corps, firing high-explosive and mustard gas bombardments, which caused many casualties to the British gunners, who could not be rested during the preparatory period, firing a record amount of ammunition but having to distribute it as far back as Flandern I. In 1996, Prior and Wilson wrote that the French First Army, XIV Corps, XVIII Corps and XIX Corps advanced about 3,000 yards (2,700 m) took two German defensive positions and deprived the Germans of their observation posts on Pilckem Ridge, a "substantial achievement" despite the later repulse of the XVIII and XIX corps from the areas of the green and red lines. II Corps on the Gheluvelt Plateau had only advanced about 1,000 yards (910 m) beyond the Albrecht Stellung but took Bellewaarde Ridge and Stirling Castle. The training of the Fifth Army troops had enabled them to use Lewis guns, rifle grenades, trench mortars and tanks to overwhelm German pill boxes, where the artillery had managed to neutralise the defenders of a sufficient number in advance. Casualties were about the same, unlike 1 July 1916 when the British had only inflicted a few thousand on the Germans. The Fifth Army captured about 18 square miles (47 km2) on 31 July compared to only 3.5 square miles (9.1 km2) on the First day of the Somme.

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The advance was still conducted in waves behind a creeping barrage, to ensure that the infantry arrived simultaneously at German trenches but the waves were composed of skirmish lines and columns of sections, often advancing in artillery formation, to allow them to deploy quickly when German resistance was encountered. Artillery formation covered a 100-yard (91 m) frontage and 30–50-yard (27–46 m) depth in a lozenge shape, the rifle section forward with the rifle bombers and bombing sections arranged behind on either side. The platoon headquarters followed, slightly in front of the Lewis gun section. Artillery was much more plentiful and efficient in 1917 and had been equipped with a local communications network, which led a corresponding devolution of authority and a much quicker response to changing circumstances.

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The German trenches were on drier ground but barely above water level and parapets and breastworks had been built up, rather than trenches dug. It had proved impossible to build concrete artillery-observation posts, which left the position vulnerable to a surprise attack. The intended slow build-up of Allied air activity over the Ypres salient was changed to a maximum effort, after a weather delay on 11 July, due to the extent of the opposition of the Luftstreitkräfte. The Germans had been sending larger formations into action and on 12 July, the greatest amount of air activity occurred since the beginning of the war. Thirty German fighters engaged Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and French fighters of the Service Aéronautique in a dogfight lasting an hour, the RFC losing nine aircraft and the Luftstreitkräfte fourteen. The Germans resisted the British and French air effort until the end of July, when their losses forced a change to more defensive tactics. The attack was delayed on 1 July, at the request of Anthoine as the French needed more time to prepare artillery emplacements. On 7 July, Gough asked for another postponement of five days. Some British heavy artillery had been lost to the German counter-bombardment, some had been delayed and bad weather had hampered the programme of counter-battery fire. Haig agreed to delay until the 28 July. Anthoine then requested another delay because the poor weather had slowed his artillery preparation and after Gough supported Anthoine, Haig reluctantly agreed to delay to 31 July, even though this meant postponing Operation Hush from 7–8 August, to the next period of high tides. The first of a series of set-piece attacks was to begin with an advance to three objectives, the blue, black and green lines, through the German front line system and then the Albrecht Stellung (second line) and Wilhelm Stellung (third line), which were approximately 1,000, 2,000 and 3,500 yards (910, 1,830 and 3,200 m) from the British front line, at any of which a halt could be called if necessary.

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At zero + 130 minutes, it was to advance in 100 yd (91 m) lifts every eight minutes to the final objective. After another pause the barrage was to creep forward at hourly intervals for 1,500 yd (1,400 m) into the German defences. The defensive barrage by the first two belts from the field artillery was to stop at 11:20 a.m. except for SOS fire and the two back belts of heavy and medium artillery at 1:44 p.m. German defensive preparations Main articles: 4th Army defensive changes: September–November 1917 and Actions of 30 September – 4 October 1917 From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by six German defensive positions: the front line, Albrechtstellung (second position), Wilhelmstellung (third position), Flandern I Stellung (fourth position), Flandern II Stellung (fifth position) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction). In between the German defence positions lay the Belgian villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendaele. The German fortifications had been breached in several places since the start of the British assault on 31 July 1917. Ludendorff met the local commanders at Roulers on 29 September where the "complete breakdown" of the German defensive system was described to him; Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of forward garrisons by the ground-holding divisions. All available machine-guns including those of the support and reserve battalions of the front line regiments, were sent into the forward zone to form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yd (230 m). Ground holding divisions were reinforced by the Stoss regiment of each of the Eingreif divisions, which were moved up behind each front division into the artillery protective line, which backed on to the forward battle zone, to launch earlier counter-attacks while the British were consolidating. The bulk of the Eingreif divisions were to be held back and used for a methodical counter-stroke on the next day or the one after and for spoiling attacks between British offensives. These changes were incorporated in a 4th Army operation order of 30 September.

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The 4th Army held a front of 25 miles (40 km) with three Gruppen, composed of a corps headquarters and a varying complement of divisions; Group Staden, based on the headquarters of the Guards Reserve Corps was added later. Group Dixmude held 12 miles (19 km) with four front divisions and two Eingreif divisions, Group Ypres held 6 miles (9.7 km) from Pilckem to Menin Road with three front divisions and two Eingreif divisions and Group Wijtschate held a similar length of front south of the Menin road, with three front divisions and three Eingreif divisions. The Eingreif divisions were stationed behind the Menin and Passchendaele ridges. About 5 miles (8.0 km) further back, were four more Eingreif divisions and 7 miles (11 km) beyond them, another two in Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) reserve. The Germans were anxious that the British would attempt to exploit the victory at the Battle of Messines, with an advance to the Tower Hamlets spur, beyond the north end of Messines Ridge. On 9 June, Crown Prince Rupprecht proposed a withdrawal to the Flandern line east of Messines. Construction of defences began but were terminated after Fritz von Loßberg was appointed as the new Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. Loßberg rejected the proposed withdrawal to the Flandern line and ordered that the current front line east of the Oosttaverne line be held rigidly. To this end, the Flandern Stellung (Flanders Position) along Passchendaele Ridge, in front of the Flandern line, would become the Flandern I Stellung and a new Flandern II Stellung would run west of Menin and north to Passchendaele. Construction of a Flandern III Stellung east of Menin northwards to Moorslede was also begun. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by the front position, Albrecht Stellung (second line), Wilhelm Stellung (third line), Flandern I Stellung (fourth line), Flandern II Stellung (fifth line) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction); between the German defences lay the villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendale.

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Overall the results of the four-day preliminary artillery bombardment proved unsatisfactory. The Allied fire did not cause severe damage to the Bulgarian and German defensive line while the greater focus of the artillery fire on some points of the line gave a clear indication of the directions where the main attack was to be delivered. The defenders also used every possible moment to repair the damage to their fortifications under the cover of their own artillery. It must also be noted that the Bulgarian and German artillery and its observations posts were practically untouched by the Allied bombardment. While the Bulgarian infantry units suffered 945 casualties during the four day of bombardment, the losses of the artillery were only 10 men killed or wounded and several guns damaged or destroyed. The beginning of the infantry attack was set by the Allied command for 6:30 on 9 of May and as the infantry prepared the artillery resumed its barrage with much greater vigor, once again engulfing the entire defensive line in a cloud of smoke and dust. At precisely 6:30 the Italian, French and Russian infantry moved out of their trenches and advanced against the Bulgarian and German positions along an 11-kilometer long line.The 35th Italian Infantry Division attacked the Bulgarian 2/2 Infantry Brigade and German 201st Infantry Brigade with its Sicilia and Ivrea infantry brigades(61st, 62nd, 161st and 162nd infantry regiments). The focal points of the assault were the powerful positions on Hill 1020 and Hill 1050. To the right parts of the 61st regiment took advantage of the dust cloud, left by the barrage, and managed to capture a forward trench that the Bulgarians had evacuated in order to preserve their infantry from the Allied artillery fire.

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On 25 June, Erich Ludendorff, the First Quartermaster General, suggested to Crown Prince Rupprecht that Group Ypres should withdraw to the Wilhelm Stellung, leaving only outposts in the Albrecht Stellung. On 30 June, the army group Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl, suggested a withdrawal to the Flandern I Stellung along Passchendaele ridge, meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck and close to Armentières in the south. Such a withdrawal would avoid a hasty retreat from Pilckem Ridge and force the British into a time-consuming redeployment. Lossberg disagreed, believing that the British would launch a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Sehnen line was easy to defend, that the Menin road ridge could be held, if it was made the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) of the German defensive effort. Pilckem Ridge deprived the British of ground observation over the Steenbeek Valley, while the Germans could see the area from Passchendaele Ridge, allowing German infantry to be supported by observed artillery fire. Lossberg's judgement was accepted and no withdrawal was made. Main article: Battle of Messines (1917) The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. The German positions had observation over Ypres and unless captured, would enable observed enfilade artillery-fire against a British attack eastwards from the salient. Since mid-1915, the British had been covertly digging mines under the German positions on the ridge. By June 1917, 21 mines had been filled with nearly 1,000,000 long tons (1,000,000 t) of explosives. The Germans knew the British were mining and had taken some counter-measures but they were taken by surprise at the extent of the British effort. Two of the mines failed to detonate but 19 went off on 7 June, at 3:10 a.m. British Summer Time. The final objectives were largely gained before dark and the British had fewer losses than expected, the plan having provided for up to 50 percent in the initial attack. Battle of Messines (1917) 　メセンの戦い

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Charbonneau explained that the defeat of the Colonial Corps was caused by faulty reconnaissance, the ineffectiveness of advanced guards in causing delay to advancing German units and that French offensive tactics neglected the importance of obtaining a superiority of fire, which had led to reckless attacks. The quality of the German opponents was not mentioned but German reconnaissance had been effective, communication between commanders and subordinates had not broken down, mutual support between neighbouring units had occurred and German artillery had provided continuous close fire support.[9] At Neufchâteau, the French colonial infantry had been out-gunned and outnumbered by German units, which had been able to engage all their forces quickly. The French XII Corps had a greater number of guns but was not able to overcome two German infantry battalions. German artillery had engaged the Colonial Brigade from close range but when in a hastily occupied defensive position, the French had nullified much of the German artillery-fire; French troops caught in the open had been annihilated. Both sides had attempted to gain fire superiority before advancing and once this had been achieved by the Germans, they had been able to manoeuvre without severe casualties.

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Since the "Lone How" was only 40 yards (37 m) behind the British front line, orders had been given to destroy it, in the event of a German raid and a demolition charge had been left on the gun with a lit fuze. On 29 April, the German infantry sent up a green then a red flare and at 3:45 a.m., German artillery began to bombard the reserve and communication trenches of the 16th Division. A gas cloud was released, followed by white smoke from Chalk Pit Wood to Hulluch, after Bavarian Infantry Regiment 9 had been ordered to discharge the gas by higher authority, despite unfavourable winds. German raiding parties advanced, as the gas moved very slowly and then veered about, as it reached the British third line; the German raiders were then engaged by British infantry with small-arms fire.

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The British set-piece attack in late 1917 The German 4th Army had held on to the Gheluvelt plateau during August in a costly defensive success, which worsened the manpower shortage that the German defensive strategy for 1917 was intended to remedy. Haig transferred command of the offensive to General Plumer, the Second Army commander on 25 August and moved the northern boundary of the Second Army closer to the Ypres–Roulers railway. More heavy artillery was sent to Flanders from the armies further south and placed opposite the Gheluvelt plateau. Plumer continued the development of British attacking methods, which had also taken place in the Fifth Army, during the slow and costly progress in August, against the German defence-in-depth and the unusually wet weather. After a pause of about three weeks, Plumer intended to capture Gheluvelt plateau in four steps, with six days between each step to allow time to bring forward artillery and supplies. Each attack was to have limited geographical objectives like the attacks in August, with infantry brigades re-organised to attack the first objective with one battalion each and the final one with two battalions. Derelict tank used as the roof of a dug out, Zillebeke, 20 September 1917 (Q6416) Plumer arranged for much more medium and heavy artillery to be added to the creeping bombardment, which had been impossible with the amount of artillery available to Gough. The revised attack organisation was intended to have more infantry attacking on narrower fronts, to a shallower depth than the attack of 31 July. The quicker and shorter advances were intended to be consolidated on tactically advantageous ground (particularly on reverse slopes), with the infantry in contact with their artillery and air support, ready to repulse counter-attacks. The faster tempo of the operations was intended to add to German difficulties in replacing tired divisions through the transport bottlenecks behind the German front.

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Joffre supported the intervention by Foch and also ordered d'Urbal to restrict attacks to piecemeal efforts against local points of tactical importance. Until 15 June the French made many limited attacks on the flanks of the 77th and Moroccan divisions, using the same troops and same tactics. On 23 May the XXI Corps captured the rest of the Lorette Spur and on 27 May the 70th Division took Ablain cemetery, then the sugar refinery on 31 May, which made Souchez vulnerable to an attack from the west as well as the south. The limited narrow-front attacks were much better supported by the artillery. A revised version of Note 5779 was issued on 20 May by GQG, which asserted that the version of 16 April had been vindicated by events. The new version endorsed "continuous battle" and emphasised that reserves must be pushed forward to avoid the mistake made on 9 May, when they had been held back out of German artillery range. An analysis of German defensive methods, described the use of small numbers of infantry equipped with large numbers of machine-guns, firing from flanks and the sheltering of infantry in deep dug-outs, immune to field artillery; French defensive positions were to be modelled on the German practice. Local attacks were resumed but while modestly successful and remaining within the material constraints on the Tenth Army, were hampered by a drastic loss of experience, caused by the extent of French losses. The tempo of limited attacks was beyond the capacity of the Tenth Army to supply and train replacement soldiers according to the requirements of Note 5779. An attempt to return to larger combined attacks by IX, XXI and XXXIII corps from 25 to 26 May failed in most places, because of increases in the capability of the German defence, the impossibility of obtaining surprise and a lack of time to plan operations or to rest troops. Pétain wrote that German barrages were being fired daily, which made infantry attacks almost impossible and that varying French bombardments to obtain surprise made little difference, now that the German artillery had been reinforced and was ready at a moment's notice to begin barrage fire. German guns were registered on no man's land and had only to fire into the area to hit French infantry during an attack. The French counter-battery effort had to wait until German guns revealed themselves and then begin area fire near the German artillery, which was a waste of ammunition.

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New smoke shells were fired when the creeping barrage paused beyond each objective, which helped to obscure the British infantry from artillery observers and German machine-gunners far back in the German defensive zone who fired through the British artillery barrages. Around Langemarck, the British infantry formed up close the German positions, too near for the German artillery to fire on for fear of hitting their infantry, although British troops further back at the Steenbeek were severely bombarded. British platoons and sections were allotted objectives and engineers accompanied troops to bridge obstacles and attack strong points. In the 20th Division, each company was reduced to three platoons, two to advance using infiltration tactics and one to mop up areas where the forward platoons had by-passed resistance by attacking from the flanks and from behind. In the II and XIX Corps areas, the foremost infantry had been isolated by German artillery and then driven back by counter-attacks. On 17 August, Gough ordered that the capture of the remainder of their objectives of 16 August would be completed on 25 August. Apart from small areas on the left of the 56th Division (Major-General F. A. Dudgeon), the flanks of the 8th Division and right of the 16th Division, the British had been forced back to their start line by German machine-gun fire from the flanks and infantry counter-attacks supported by plentiful artillery. Attempts by the German infantry to advance further were stopped by British artillery-fire, which inflicted many losses. Dudgeon reported that there had been a lack of time to prepare the attack and study the ground, since the 167th Brigade had relieved part of the 25th Division after it had only been in the line for 24 hours; neither unit had sufficient time to make preparations for the attack. Dudgeon also reported that no tracks had been laid beyond Château Wood, that the wet ground had slowed the delivery of supplies to the front line and obstructed the advance beyond it. Pillboxes had caused more delays and subjected the attacking troops to frequent enfilade fire.

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On the north bank of the Aisne the French attack was more successful, the 42nd and 69th divisions reached the German second position between the Aisne and the Miette, the advance north of Berry penetrating 2.5 miles (4.0 km). Tanks to accompany the French infantry to the third objective arrived late and the troops were too exhausted and reduced by casualties to follow the tanks. Half of the tanks were knocked-out in the German defences and then acted as pill-boxes in advance of the French infantry, which helped to defeat a big German counter-attack. German infantry launched hasty counter-attacks along the front, recaptured Bermericourt and conducted organised counter-attacks where the French infantry had advanced the furthest. At Sapigneul in the XXXII Corps area, the 37th Division attack failed, which released German artillery in the area to fire in enfilade into the flanks of the adjacent divisions, which had been able to advance and the guns were also able to engage the French tanks north of the Aisne. The defeat of the 37th Division restored the German defences between Loivre and Juvincourt. The left flank division of the XXXII Corps and the right division of the V Corps penetrated the German second position south of Juvincourt but French tanks attacking south of the Miette from Bois de Beau Marais advanced to disaster.

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In June 1916, the amount of French artillery at Verdun had been increased to 2,708 guns, including 1,138 × 75 mm field guns; the French and German armies fired c. 10,000,000 shells, with a weight of 1,350,000 long tons (1,370,000 t) from February–December. The German offensive had been contained by French reinforcements, difficulties of terrain and the weather by May, with the 5th Army infantry stuck in tactically dangerous positions, overlooked by the French on the east bank and the west bank, instead of secure on the Meuse Heights. Attrition of the French forces was inflicted by constant infantry attacks, which were vastly more costly than waiting for French counter-attacks and defeating them with artillery. The stalemate was broken by the Brusilov Offensive and the Anglo-French relief offensive on the Somme, which had been expected to lead to the collapse of the Anglo-French armies.

German Troops Under Attack: British Aircraft Strikes Low

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お手数ですが、次の英文を訳して下さい。

英文を訳して下さい。

英文を訳して下さい。

英文翻訳をお願いします。

和訳をお願いします。

英文を訳して下さい。

英文を訳して下さい。

英文を訳して下さい。

日本語訳をお願いいたします。

英文を訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

注目のQ&A

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