Indian Units in World War I: Ill-equipped and Understaffed| OKWAVE

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Comparatively, the Indian units were even more ill-equipped for modern war than the rest of troops of Britain's empire. Indian divisions had less artillery assigned to it. At the start of the war, an Indian Division had one brigade of artillery, as opposed to the three assigned to a British European division. What artillery that an Indian division did have was typically lighter, more suited for expeditions along the North-West Frontier. Its troops were deliberately kept a generation behind in infantry weaponry. During their time in France, the Indian Corps divisions had been brought up to date with the latest weaponry, including flare guns and bombs. However, when withdrawn from France, most of this equipment was left behind in France for their replacements to use. To manage the fighting of this ad-hoc unit, Aylmer had almost no staff support. His staff for the relief force, designated as Tigris Corps, consisted of one staff officer, one wounded officer, and one brigadier who had failed to finish the Quetta Staff College. In addition to this staff, his collection of brigades would be under the command of the Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC of the 7th (Meerut) Division, who was without his staff. Just after the new year, Aylmer's ordered his force to move upriver from Ali Gharbi.

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Not only did Lake lack faith in Aylmer's abilities, Aylmer himself had lost confidence in the abilities of his subordinates. Of his two divisional commanders, Major-General Henry D'Urban Kearny, GOC 3rd (Lahore) Division, and Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC 7th (Meerut) Division, neither were detailed to the principal commander for the planned operation. Major-General D'Urban Keary would be assigned to command one of the three columns, the other two being commanded by Major-General George Kemball, one of his brigade commanders. Aylmer made his decision claiming that Kemball was a more energetic commander. Major-General Younghusband, who had been the chief proponent of a desert march to outflank the Ottoman lines entirely, was assigned to command the diversion force on the left bank. Like the British, the Ottoman Sixth Army was also stretched to the limit of logistical support. The lack of any sort of industrial infrastructure (i.e. paved road capable of military transport or railways) made it exceedingly difficult for the Sixth Army to be rapidly reinforced. What the Ottoman army did have going in its favor was time. They had recognized that for the time, they were at the extent of their supply line from Baghdad.

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Downriver from Kut, at Ali Gharbi, Lieutenant-General Fenton Aylmer was collecting forces to relieve the Kut garrison. Initially, the only force available in theatre which were not already in Kut was the 6th Indian Cavalry Brigade and the 35th and 28th Indian Brigades. They would soon be joined by the first elements of the 7th (Meerut) Division. With pressure from both Townshend in Kut and Nixon in Basra, Aylmer succumbed to their demands and began his advance upriver as soon as his he had collected three full brigades of infantry. Setting out on 4 January 1916, Aylmer would be able to commit approximately 9,900 infantry, 1340 cavalry, and 42 field guns. Additionally, along the Tigris there would be four gunboats to support the advance.

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Colonel Khalil Pasha's XIII Corps, composed up of 35th and 52nd Infantry Divisions, moved down river to block any advance by the Tigris Corps. The 52nd Division had arrived in region in time to take part in the Battle of Ctesiphon and the early stages of the siege of Kut. It was a war formed division which originally served in Caucasus region before being rushed to the Mesopotamian theater. The 35th Division, on the other hand, was a pre-war division that had originally been assigned to defend the Basra and Baghdad vilayets. Along with the 38th Division, they had unsuccessfully opposed the I.E.F. "D" initial advances. After suffering heavy casualties, the survivors of the 35th and 38th Divisions had been consolidated into a single division. While this brought the 35th Division up to something close to an effective combat strength, it also brought with it the morale problems which had existed in the 38th Division. The 38th Division had been composed primarily of levies from the Arab and Kurdish populations. Neither group felt any particular attachment to the Ottoman government. Their loyalty was suspect, and discipline was always a problem. Between them, the 35th and 52nd Divisions would be able to muster approximately 9000 infantry, 20 artillery pieces, a brigade of cavalry, as well as a group of mounted Arab irregulars.

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The Third Battle of Krithia (Turkish: Üçüncü Kirte Muharebesi), fought on the Gallipoli peninsula during World War I, was the last in a series of Allied attacks against the Ottoman defences aimed at achieving the original objectives of 25 April 1915. The previous failures in the first and second battles resulted in a less ambitious plan being developed for the attack, but the outcome was another costly failure for the Allies. The allied aim was, as always to facilitate the capture of Alçı Tepe (Achi Baba) which commanded most of the peninsula. By late May, the British contingent on the Cape Helles front at Gallipoli had been expanded to three division and a brigade: the 29th Division (which had made the original landing), the Royal Naval Division (now reinforced to 12 battalions), the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division and the 29th Indian Brigade. On 24 May, the commander of the 29th Division, Major General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the British VIII Corps containing all British units at Helles. Major General Beauvoir De Lisle took over command of the 29th Division. The early battles at Helles had been fought over thinly fortified ground, but by late May two lines of trenches had begun to demarcate the battlefield. The British, in readiness for a new offensive, had been advancing their front line by stealth during the night, eventually gaining half a mile in ground while incurring only slight casualties and placing themselves within striking distance of the Ottoman front line. The French contingent at Helles occupied the right (eastern side) of the line along the Dardanelles shore and astride the Kereves Spur. They were confronted by some of the strongest Ottoman defences, dominated by four redoubts. On 31 May, they managed to capture one of the redoubts but repeated attempts to take Haricot Redoubt failed making any advance on that front without overwhelming artillery support a hazardous proposition. The artillery situation at Helles, as at Anzac Cove, remained perilous. The British had only 78 guns and howitzers and were still short of ammunition. When the battleship HMS Triumph was sunk on 25 May and another battleship—HMS Majestic—sunk on 27 May, both torpedoed, the situation worsened as the naval gunfire support was reduced. Those ships that remained in support could only fire while steaming at 12 kn (14 mph; 22 km/h), which did nothing to aid their accuracy. Hunter-Weston's previous battle plans lacked subtlety or sense, and he had been unerring in his failure. For the latest attempt on Krithia, some elements of refinement had begun to appear in the plans. For one, General Sir Ian Hamilton, the commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, insisted that the objectives should be limited to an advance of 800 yd (730 m). This was to be made in two steps: the first step was to capture the Turkish trenches; the second was to advance a further 500 yd (460 m) and establish a new trench line. The Third Battle of Krithia 第三次クリチアの戦い

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In the face of immense losses, Faik Paşa had stopped first the counterattack on the morning of 30 June. In spite of strong and direct urging from Liman Paşa (Otto Liman von Sanders) and pressure to continue the counter-attack, he wanted to rest his badly decimated troops for a day. Hesitation of Faik Paşa unnerved Weber Paşa who was in command of the front there. He contemplated pulling back behind the ever strategic Alçı Tepe as a last resort. This would have given over complete victory to the Allies. He had to be strongly dissuaded by Liman Paşa. Finally, the Ottoman 1st Division led by Lieutenant Colonel (Kaymakam) Cafer Tayyar Bey commenced another counterattack at 18:00 on 2 July. Again, though they reached within 30m of the British trenches, the losses were unbearable. Men were melting away in front of rows of machine guns. Attack continued whole night. Eventually Faik Paşa ordered them to dig in and take defensive posture. Liman Paşa immediately released him and assigned Mehmet Ali Paşa in his place. As soon as the 3. Division which had just crossed the Narrows and arrived at the lines around midnight, Mehmet Ali Paşa ordered them to attack 3:45 am. Liman Paşa agreed to delay the attack for 24 hours only after a Major Eggert on the staff of Mehmet Ali Paşa personally appealed to him. Meanwhile, the Allies had observed the preparation for the attack from the air and made their own preparations. On 5 July the last major attack of this battle commenced but met with a very strong wall of fire the Allies put up. The dead were mounting again in front of the British trenches. Mehmet Ali Paşa staff were of the opinion that the Allied advance was already halted and there was no need for these heavy losses. Mehmet Ali Paşa, in fear of a reaction from Liman Paşa, who was in turn intimidated by Enver Paşa hesitated. Again, Major Eggert intervened and Liman Paşa yielded. Finally the slaughter was stopped. This was the bloodiest episode in the entire campaign. After the counter-attacks ceased, the front line stabilised and remained largely static for the rest of the Gallipoli campaign although both sides engaged in a vigorous mining war around the ravine. Hunter-Weston had one final fling at Helles. Once the two remaining brigades of the 52nd Division had landed (the 155th and 157th Brigades) he planned a new attack for 12 July in the centre of the line east of the Krithia Road and along Achi Baba Nullah (also known as Kanlı Dere and Bloody Valley) where the Royal Naval Division had spent most of its time at Helles and suffered so badly during the third battle of Krithia. It was expected that due to heavy Ottoman losses in the previous battle, morale would be low. The plan was for one brigade to attack in the morning and the other to attack in the afternoon so that the full weight of artillery support could be lent to each brigade. The 155th Brigade would attack at 7.35 am and the 157th at 4.50 pm.

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Despite the casualties, Aylmer could not afford to spend much time waiting for the arrival of the second division of reinforcements still working its way upriver to the front. Every advance he made, put him further from his supply base at Basra, and closer to the Ottoman logistical hub at Baghdad. Although considered a British victory (albeit a costly one), the Ottoman forces had achieved their goal in delaying the Tigris Corps. They had bloodied Aylmer's forces, using up time which the Kut garrison believed it did not have and reinforcements which were hard for the British and Indian governments to replace.

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Aylmer therefore devised a plan whereby his force would cross the Tigris for a straightforward attack upon the Turk-held Dujaila Redoubt, at the extreme outer edge of Es Sinn, which held some 25,000 experienced troops, many of whom had fought at Gallipoli as well as along the Tigris. Aylmer was nevertheless keen to await further reinforcement from Gallipoli. He was however over-ruled by Lake, who was wary of delaying while the floods increased in strength, and instructed to launch an attack no later than 15 March 1916. Indian troops prayingThus Aylmer ordered the bulk of his two divisions - approximately 35,000 men and 62 guns - to march overnight preparatory to storming Dujaila Redoubt while 6,500 were left behind in front of Hanna. Meanwhile Townshend was to separately attack Turk forces from behind. Originally scheduled to begin on 6 March the attack was postponed until 8 March on account of heavy rainfall. General Kemball led the main advance at 10am; but by noon he was stopped around 700 metres short of the Redoubt.

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The key to whether the Kut garrison would be able to hold out was food. After early attempts to storm the town failed, the Ottoman forces investing Kut opted to starve the defenders into submission. Townshend had ordered some of his forces to break out and regroup downriver where the remnants of I.E.F. "D" were beginning to gather. However, even by decreasing the number of mouths to feed, the food problem was more complex than simply the amount available. As the siege began to drag on, Townshend sent word to Nixon that his food supply would only last until 15 January 1916. The Kut garrison was made up of the 6th (Poona) Division. Unlike a typical British division, or even an Ottoman one, Indian Army divisions had a complex make up. Battalions would be made up of companies from the various Indian ethnic and religious groups. Each group had its own dietary requirements. Hindus, for example, would never touch meat from a cow or even allow their food to be cooked in pots which had cooked cow meat. Sikhs, while allowing meat to be eaten, could not eat any animals slaughtered in accordance with a ritual, such as halal. Muslim troops required food prepared in accordance with halal. Finally, there were the British troops, whose diet was decided by Whitehall. Along the North-West Frontier, where Indian Army units traditionally were assigned, the mixed dietary needs were manageable. But in Mesopotamia, at the end of a long and poorly developed supply line, the problem was significantly more difficult. At the start of the siege, in December 1915, Townshend reported he had enough food to feed the sepoys of his division for 54 days.

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Colonel Nureddin had over 55 days to prepare his defenses, and his forces prepared them well. He deployed his forces in an L shaped formation. The 38th Division occupied the long part of the L. The new and fresh 45th Division held most vulnerable part of the line, the small leg of the L on the left, with one regiment up in the front line trenches and two in reserve. There were 12 strong points along the first trench line, and a complete second line of trenches to fall back into. In general reserve was the veteran 51st Division. The 35th was across the river.The Ottoman artillery was centrally located where it could support his left flank or the central part of his line.The artillery was ordered to fire first on the British gunboats, and then shift fire to support the Ottoman reserves.

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Colonel Nureddin had over 55 days to prepare his defenses, and his forces prepared them well. He deployed his forces in an L shaped formation. The 38th Division occupied the long part of the L. The new and fresh 45th Division held most vulnerable part of the line, the small leg of the L on the left, with one regiment up in the front line trenches and two in reserve. There were 12 strong points along the first trench line, and a complete second line of trenches to fall back into. In general reserve was the veteran 51st Division. The 35th was across the river.The Ottoman artillery was centrally located where it could support his left flank or the central part of his line.The artillery was ordered to fire first on the British gunboats, and then shift fire to support the Ottoman reserves.

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Although the Aylmer's force had captured Sheikh Sa'ad, it had cost him nearly 4,400 dead and wounded to do so. The Ottoman forces on the left bank of the Tigris had not been broken. Although General Nixon, in his dispatch to the War Office, would estimate that the Ottoman forces had suffered 4,400 casualties, this number is suspect. Although Kemball's force on the right bank was successful in breaking into the Ottoman defenses, the same did not happen on the left bank. Furthermore, there were many reports that the artillery fire, due to the lack of good observation points and the Ottoman camouflage efforts, was ineffective. When it became clear that their right bank defenses had fallen, they displaced in good order, taking with them all their artillery. Retreating seven miles upriver, they occupied the defenses being readied at the Wadi.

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Prior to arriving in theater, Meerut Division had briefly refit in Egypt after being withdrawn from France. Although prized by I.E.F. "D" as a veteran formation, the Meerut Division's experienced had come at a high price. As part of Indian Expeditionary Force A, later re-designated as the Indian Corps, the Meerut Division had arrived in France in September 1914, participating in the Battle of La Bassée, Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Battle of Aubers, and Battle of Loos. By December 1915, the division has suffered heavy casualties among the sepoys and their British officers. The Indian Army's reserve system, never fully developed before the war, was overtaxed trying to resupply the division's battalions with fresh, trained sepoys. Even more difficult was the problem of finding replacement officers to command the Indian troops. Since the Sepoy Mutiny, British policy had been to ensure that senior officers of an Indian Army unit would always be British. Only European Britons could hold positions as company commanders, adjutants, quartermasters, and battalion commanders. However, not any British officer would be effective commanding the Indian troops. It took time to teach language and cultural skills necessary to deal with the various castes, religions, and ethnicities that made up the Indian Army.

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Not only was it problematic finding qualified British officers to command the companies and battalions of the Indian Army, there was also a shortage of trained Indians to be granted a Viceroy's Commission. Viceroy Commissioned Officers occupied a unique position between the junior British officers and the senior non-commissioned officers. During its year in France, the VCO's of the Meerut had also suffered heavy casualties. Prior to the war, when most operations of the Indian Army were along the North-West Frontier, there had never been a need to quickly produce VCOs. Consequently, those who were promoted to the rank of VCO was typically a long service soldier of many years of experience. With the heavy casualties of France, the system had not yet caught up to the realities of the new type of war they were fighting. Confronted with a type of war they had never expected to be a part of, morale among the Indian troops plummeted. As an added insult, when the Meerut and Lahore Divisions were withdrawn from France, they ceased receiving combat pay, even though they were being shipped Egypt, under threat from Ottoman force, and then to Mesopotamia, to actively take part in an offensive.

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Although some of Aylmer's assault force was in position, some of it was still struggling to sort itself out from the night march as the barrage began. One unit which did reach its start position on time, the 37th Indian Brigade, was accompanied by Kearny, Aylmer and Gorringe. Despite finding that there a gap in the lines, the Corps and Column commander, as well as the Corps Chief of Staff, held the 37th Brigade back, ordering it to wait and follow the plan's timetable.The infantry assault, originally planned for 7:15 a.m. did not go in till later. The artillery, which should have started their bombardment earlier, did not get into action until almost 7 a.m. Paradoxically, once the barrage started, all hope of surprise was lost. Through the day, the Anglo-Indian battalions assaulted the Ottoman positions, only to be pinned down and driven back by machine gun and artillery fire.

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At the Battle of Mons the BEF had some 80,000 men, comprising the Cavalry Division, an independent cavalry brigade and two corps, each with two infantry divisions. I Corps was commanded by Sir Douglas Haig and was composed of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. II Corps was commanded by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and consisted of the 3rd and 5th Divisions. Each division had 18,073 men and 5,592 horses, in three brigades of four battalions. Each division had twenty-four Vickers machine guns – two per battalion – and three field artillery brigades with fifty-four 18-pounder guns, one field howitzer brigade of eighteen 4.5-inch howitzers and a heavy artillery battery of four 60-pounder guns.

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Given the strength of the Ottoman defences at the Hanna, the Anglo-Indian forces needed to find a way around them. On the left bank of the Tigris, this would mean swinging wide around the Ottoman defenses and marching at least 30 miles through the desert. Then, relying on Shatt al-Hayy for their communications, the force would break through the Ottoman lines and link up with the Kut garrison. The other option was to continue along Tigris River, but switching to the right bank. However, this would mean having to break through the Ottoman defenses at Dujaila. Unwilling to leave the Tigris, which provided the British forces with an easy line of communication to Basra, Lieutenant-General Aylmer made the decision to attempt an advance along the right bank. Like the left bank, the terrain was mostly featureless and devoid of cover. The Ottoman units, with their German advisers, had become adept at camouflaging their positions, making it hard for the British and Indian units to fix them properly. What was known was that Ottomans were in the process of constructing a redoubt at Dujaila. Since there was no way to cover a move across the river and through the Dujaila position, Aylmer and his staff put together a plan that called for a night assault by the majority of his force while a detachment would remain behind on the left bank as a diversion. However, prior to putting the plan into effect, Aylmer had to get approval of the new commander of I.E.F. D, Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake. After the Battle of the Hanna, General Lake had begun to lose faith in Aylmer's abilities as commander of the Tigris Corps. In order to exert greater control over the coming battle, he had replaced Aylmer's chief of staff with his own man, Major-General George Gorringe.

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Despite the two-hour delay, the assault elements of Column A and B were in position just before dawn on 8 March 1916. The lead elements of 26th Punjabis (part of 36th Indian Brigade attached to Column A) pushed forward, entering the Dujalia position to find them occupied only by a few unsuspecting soldiers. The news was reported back to Kemball that surprise had been achieved. However, despite achieving total surprise, Kemball ordered his units to wait until the pre-planned H-Hour for the assault. He even ordered the Punjabis to withdraw from the Ottoman positions. Three hours would pass before Kemball would allow the 36th Brigade to attack the Dujalia redoubt. By the time Kemball allowed the attack to go in, all hope of surprise had been lost. As the artillery began its preparatory bombardment, Von Der Goltz began ferrying over the 52nd Division from his reserve on the left bank to reinforce the divisions which were now fully alert and manning the trenches. By the end of the battle, nearly 8,000 men were ferried across the river and brought into fighting positions, effectively doubling the strength of the Ottoman garrison on the right bank.

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However, the 52nd Division did reach Beit Likia and the Yeomanry Division Beit Ur el Tahta by the end of the first day. The 75th, advancing along the only real road in the area, made good progress, fighting through the Ottoman hilltop defences, secured the villages of Saris and Kuryet el Enab on 20 November. The first village in the afternoon, the second before nightfall, in an infantry assault under cover of a thick belt of fog, which obscured the defenders vision. They had however only come up against rearguard positions and still had to face the main Ottoman force. Elsewhere the 52nd Division were making some progress but the yeomanry were confronted by a strong position of 3,000 infantry supported by artillery on the Zeitun ridge west of Bireh. During a back and forwards battle the yeomanry did at one stage capture the position, but were forced back again on 21 November. On the same day, the 75th Division changed the direction of the attack north-east towards Biteh, to meet up with the mounted division. The division was stopped at Biddu, and the heights of Nebi Samwil. Fighting through the day, the village was eventually taken by the 234th Brigade that evening. However the two infantry divisions were now bogged down and no further progress could be made. The British attack continued on the next day, 22 November, against El Jib. However both infantry divisions were now in need of reinforcements, and unsupported by artillery, which could not get up the mountain tracks. Fighting for three days, but unable to break through the main Ottoman defensive position, the attack stalled. For the next two weeks, the Ottoman army tried to retake Nebi Samwil. The British captured 750 prisoners during the period. The heavy casualties they sustained during the attempt seriously affected their ability to stop the next British attempt to take Jerusalem. Considering the heavy casualties which had been sustained by his command, General Bulfin requested that XX Corps take over the line and by the 28th November the reliefs of the various of XXI Corps was completed. In obtaining a footing on some of the most difficult hills on the Judean heights the efforts of the 52nd and 75th divisions enabled General Allenby to initiate a new plan to capture Jerusalem so they share the honour with the 53rd, 60th (who were already attached to the XX Corps at Latrun) and 75th Divisions, as well the Yeoman Mounted division, which were present at the finish.

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In 1925, the British Official Historian J. E. Edmonds, wrote in the History of the Great War that from 13 to 31 October, the twelve 3rd Division battalions had been opposed by thirteen German infantry regiments, four Jäger battalions and 27 cavalry regiments. The British troops had succeeded in repulsing German attacks through endurance and fire-discipline, which had multiplied the effect of a small number of troops. The German 6th Army had been reinforced and originally been intended to break through from Arras to La Bassée and Armentières, until 29 October when all available heavy artillery was transferred north for the Battle of Gheluvelt. Attacks against II Corps were reduced to holding operations and the front opposite the French at Arras was kept passive. When the Indian Corps took over, the German offensive in the area had almost ended. Edmonds wrote that in defence, soldiers sheltered in improvised positions with little protection from artillery and little barbed wire. Much of the country was wooded, which obscured large areas of the front from aeroplane observers, who spent more time grounded by the October weather. The Allied force was made up of Belgian, French and British army units and faced a homogeneous opponent with unity of command but the main German advantage was in heavy artillery and trench warfare equipment, much of which did not exist in the Allied armies. The II Corps had c. 14,000 casualties, from 12 to 31 October. The 3rd Division had 5,835 losses, with the 8th and 9th brigades reduced by about 50 percent. The 5th Division casualties were similar and the Indian Corps up to 31 October had 1,565 casualties. On 31 October II Corps had only 14,000 men of the original 24,000 man establishment, of which c. 1,400 men were inexperienced drafts. The Germans recorded 6,000 casualties during the battles with II Corps.[48] II Corps was withdrawn for ten day's rest, from the night of 29/30 October and relieved by the Indian Corps but within days, most of its battalions had to be sent to I and III corps as reinforcements. Smith-Dorrien returned to England on 10 November and Willcocks assumed command of the 14th Brigade of the 5th Division, which acted as a mobile reserve. The Indian Corps battalions came under much shellfire during the relief and remained in the front-line trenches, instead of retreating further back temporarily, a practice which had been adopted by experienced units. On 2 November, a bigger German attack north-west of Neuve-Chapelle drove a Gurkha battalion back until local counter-attacks recovered the ground by 5 October and the old trenches were filled in and abandoned. By 3 November, the Indian Corps had suffered 1,989 casualties along its 8 mi (13 km) front. Some historians have written that c. 65 percent of Indian casualties were self-inflicted wounds, not always punished by court martial but a study by Sir B. Seton in 1915, found no evidence to support such an allegation.