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The threat never materialised, however, as the Germans were unable to complete the railway lines that were needed to support their troops in the field and the Yilderim Army Group was redirected to the Palestine front.
The threat of the Yilderim Army Group spurred the British to make another attempt to take Ramadi. Control of the town was also sought in order to deny the Turks access to fresh produce from the area, which was illicitly smuggled out of the British-controlled areas, and cut the desert road to Karbala. In mid-September 1917, General Maude ordered General Harry Brooking, commander of the 15th Indian Division, to undertake the operation. The division joined Brigadier General A. W. Andrew's 50th Indian Brigade at Falluja and set up forward positions at Madhij, east of Ramadi, by 20 September. The Turks were dug in along a line of sand dunes known as the Muskaid Ridge, about 6.5 km (4 miles) to the west of Madhij. Their main defensive positions were about 1.5 km (1 mile) further west, just south of Ramadi itself.
Brooking decided to mount a frontal attack from the south while using the 6th Indian Cavalry Brigade to cut off the garrison's line of retreat from the west. This would pin the Turks against the river, as there was no bridge at Ramadi. The Turks had assumed that the British would repeat the tactics they used in July and organised their defences accordingly to cover an arc running from the east to the south of the town. They expected to be able to use the road to the west to retreat if necessary. Since the July attack, the Turkish garrison had been substantially reinforced and now numbered 3,500 infantry, 500 artillery and 100 cavalry, with 10 artillery guns.
Brooking carried out an elaborate series of false preparations to bolster the Turks' belief that the British would once again seek to advance along the banks of the Euphrates. A pontoon bridge was built at Madhij on 28 September, troops were encamped along the river, and friendly Arab tribes were recruited to move supplies to the riverbank opposite Ramadi. Brooking's order to commence the attack was also deliberately vague, so as to conceal the true plan of attack from any Turkish spies in Madhij.

回答No.1

Nakay702 · ベストアンサー

＞The threat never materialised, however, as the Germans were unable to complete the railway lines that were needed to support their troops in the field and the Yilderim Army Group was redirected to the Palestine front.
⇒しかし、戦場でドイツ軍を支援するために必要であった鉄道線を彼らは完成することができず、イルデリム方面軍グループがパレスチナ前線に方向転換されたので、その脅威はまったく実現しなかった。

＞The threat of the Yilderim Army Group spurred the British to make another attempt to take Ramadi. Control of the town was also sought in order to deny the Turks access to fresh produce from the area, which was illicitly smuggled out of the British-controlled areas, and cut the desert road to Karbala. In mid-September 1917, General Maude ordered General Harry Brooking, commander of the 15th Indian Division, to undertake the operation.
⇒イルデリム方面軍グループの脅威は、ラマディ奪取という別の試みをすることに英国軍を駆り立てた。この町の支配はまた、この地域産の生鮮食品にトルコ軍が接近するのを拒むためにも求められた。というのも、それが英国軍の支配する地域から不法に密輸出されたので、そのためにカールバラへの砂漠の道が切断されたのである。モード将軍は、1917年9月半ばに第15インド師団の司令官ハリー・ブルッキング将軍にこの作戦行動を引き受けるよう命じた。

＞The division joined Brigadier General A. W. Andrew's 50th Indian Brigade at Falluja and set up forward positions at Madhij, east of Ramadi, by 20 September. The Turks were dug in along a line of sand dunes known as the Muskaid Ridge, about 6.5 km (4 miles) to the west of Madhij. Their main defensive positions were about 1.5 km (1 mile) further west, just south of Ramadi itself.
⇒この師団はファルージャでA. W.アンドリュー准将の第50インド旅団と合流して、9月20日までにラマディ東のマドヒジに前線陣地を設定した。トルコ軍は、マドヒジの西約6.5キロ（4マイル）のムスカイド・リッジとして知られる砂丘の戦線に沿って、塹壕を掘っていた。彼らの主要な防御陣地は、当のラマディのすぐ南約1.5キロ（1マイル）から西側方面であった。

＞Brooking decided to mount a frontal attack from the south while using the 6th Indian Cavalry Brigade to cut off the garrison's line of retreat from the west. This would pin the Turks against the river, as there was no bridge at Ramadi. The Turks had assumed that the British would repeat the tactics they used in July and organised their defences accordingly to cover an arc running from the east to the south of the town. They expected to be able to use the road to the west to retreat if necessary. Since the July attack, the Turkish garrison had been substantially reinforced and now numbered 3,500 infantry, 500 artillery and 100 cavalry, with 10 artillery guns.
⇒ブルッキングは、守備隊が西から退却するための路線を切断するために第6インド騎兵旅団を起用する一方、南から前線への攻撃にとりかかることを決意した。ラマディには橋が全然ないので、これでトルコ軍が川に押し返されて釘づけにされるだろう。トルコ軍は、英国軍が7月に使った戦術を繰り返すだろうと仮定して、それに応じて町の東から南に走る円弧をカバーするように彼らの防御体制を組織した。彼らは、退却する場合には、もし必要なら西へ行く道を使うことができると予想した。7月の攻撃以来、トルコ軍の守備隊は大幅に補強されて、今や歩兵隊3,500人、砲兵隊500人、および騎兵隊100人を数え、10門の大砲を備えていた。

＞Brooking carried out an elaborate series of false preparations to bolster the Turks' belief that the British would once again seek to advance along the banks of the Euphrates. A pontoon bridge was built at Madhij on 28 September, troops were encamped along the river, and friendly Arab tribes were recruited to move supplies to the riverbank opposite Ramadi. Brooking's order to commence the attack was also deliberately vague, so as to conceal the true plan of attack from any Turkish spies in Madhij.
⇒ブルッキングは、英国軍がもう一度ユーフラテスの両岸に沿って進軍しようとするだろうというトルコ軍の確信を強めさせるために、一連の偽りの準備工作を実行した。9月28日にラマディで浮橋が築かれて、軍隊は川に沿って野営し、ラマディの向こう側で供給品を川岸に移動させるための人手として、友好的なアラブ種族が募集された。攻撃に関する真の計画をマドヒジにいるトルコ軍のスパイから隠すために、攻撃を開始するようにというブルッキングの命令もまた意図的にぼやかされていた。

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回答ありがとうございました。