次の英文を訳して下さい。
The order was confirmed by a colonel from the II Corps staff, who, upon arriving, repeated it.
Smith-Dorrien's delaying operation never occurred because the order to defend arrived at the front line about the same time the Germans did, sometimes later. Nor were the conditions of a doctrinal delay observed, such as refusing to let British units become decisively engaged with the enemy. He did not choose positions with adequate fields-of-fire and with prepared and hidden routes of withdrawal.
According to the German official history, the IV Corps commander, Sixt von Armin, issued an order at 11:15 that turned the regimental- and brigade-level fights into a centrally coordinated battle, but there is no evidence of German command and control above the divisional level. Seventy-five percent of IV Corps troops were in contact before they received this order and the rest never made it to the battlefield. The IV Corps commander did not control the other half of the German forces, II Cavalry Corps, which fought independently.
Holding their ground despite many casualties, the British right and then the left flank began to break around midday, under unrelenting pressure from the Germans. The arrival of the Corps de cavalerie Sordet (French Cavalry Corps, General André Sordet) acted as a shield for the British left flank and supported a highly co-ordinated tactical withdrawal, despite German attempts to infiltrate and outflank the retreating British forces.
That night, the Allies withdrew to Saint-Quentin. Of the 40,000 British troops fighting at Le Cateau, 7,812 British casualties were incurred, including 2,600 taken prisoner.[8] Thirty-eight guns were abandoned, most having their breech blocks removed and sights disabled by the gunners first. II Corps retreated on the morning of 27 August and in two days of marching, broke contact with the Germans. Having lost 7,000 of its infantry at Le Cateau and 2,500–3,000 footsore and exhausted men who had to be evacuated to Le Mans for recuperation, II Corps was not battleworthy for at least two days. Although credited at the time by Field Marshal Sir John French for having saved the BEF, Smith-Dorrien was later criticized for his decision to stand at Le Cateau by French. German losses were 2,900 men.
The Germans were pleased with their victory. The historian of Infantry Regiment 93 wrote
The battle of Beaumont-Inchy will always be one of the most glorious days in the history of the regiment, which demonstrated that in a frontal attack against an enemy that was heretofore considered unbeatable, the crack troops of the British Army, the 93rd was not merely their equal, it was superior." 75th Field Artillery Regiment said that the battle "strengthened the self-confidence of the German troops … all the more so because the British army was made up almost exclusively of long-service active army troops, who were superbly trained and equipped.
— Historian, IR 93
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助かりました。ありがとうございます＞＜。