日本語訳をお願い致します。
The Ottoman 3rd Army started with 118,000 fighting men. It was reduced to 42,000 effective soldiers in January 1915, with an additional 12,000 in the Erzurum fortress garrison. 25,000 Turkish troops had become casualties even before the battle started, 30,000 frozen bodies were found by the Russians after the battle, and the entire Third Army was reduced to no more than 12,500 men. There are conflicting figures for Ottoman casualties, though it is clear that the Ottoman casualties were definitely huge, and the military hospitals of the Erzurum area were overflowed with wounded and sick. Sources do not agree on what should be included in the final sum. The Turkish official history and medical records states 33,000 KIA, 10,000 died in hospitals, 7,000 prisoners, 10,000 seriously wounded, for some 60,000 total irrecoverable casualties. Another estimate given by the German Commandant Larcher is 90,000 dead and 40,000–50,000 captured, which is often repeated in modern recountings of the battle. However, such figures are considered unreliable, both because they exceed the total strength of the entire Third Army and because the actual Chief of Staff of the Third Army (also a German), Lieutenant Colonel Guse, gave casualties as 37,000 dead and 7,000 missing based on operational returns. Artillery losses were 12 field artillery pieces and 50 mountain artillery.
The casualties of the conflict escalated beyond the end of the active warfare period as the most immediate problem confronting the 3rd Army became the typhus epidemic. TAF presents a figure of 60,000 casualties throughout the period of the operation. The Russians took 7,000 POWs including 200 officers. These prisoners were kept under confinement for the next three years in the small town of Varnavino east of Moscow on the Vetluga River. After the final days of the Russian Empire, these soldiers had a chance to return to the ailing Ottoman Empire.
Russian losses were up to 30,000: 16,000 killed and wounded and 12,000 sick/injured, mostly due to frostbite. Enver was the strategist of the operation. Hassan Izzet was the tactician who implemented the plan and remedied the shortcomings. The failure was blamed on Enver. Beyond his faulty estimate on how the enveloped Russians would react, his failure was on not keeping adequate operational reserves. He did not have enough field services to alleviate the hardships faced by the soldiers; he analyzed operational necessities theoretically rather than contextually.
Carrying out a military plan in winter was not the major failure of the operation. A valid question is whether or not the plan could have been executed better. It would be hard to exceed the performance of the Turkish soldiers. The IX and X Corps marched with maximum effectiveness given the conditions. The majority of the units managed to move to the correct positions. In respect to the inflicted Russian casualties, they should be credited.
お礼
みなさんありがとうございました． 参考になりました