British Commander's Recommendations for Advancing Troops| OKWAVE

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By mid-morning the mist had cleared, allowing German machine-gunners and artillery to pin the British down around Grote Molen spur and Frezenburg ridge, forestalling a British attack intended for 10:00 a.m.. Around noon, British aircraft on counter-attack patrols, began to send wireless messages warning of German infantry advancing towards all of the front attacked. Similar reports from the ground began in the early afternoon. In the centre German infantry from the 236th Division, 234th Division and 4th Bavarian Division were advancing north of Becelaere–Broodseinde–Passchendaele Ridge, while the 17th Division advanced south of Polygon wood. British artillery immediately bombarded these areas, disrupting the German deployment and causing the German attacks to be disjointed. A German officer later wrote of severe delays and disorganisation caused to German Eingreif units by British artillery-fire and air attacks. A counter-attack either side of Molenaarelsthoek was stopped dead at 3:25 p.m. At 4:00 p.m. German troops advancing around Reutel to the south were heavily bombarded, as were German artillery positions in Holle Bosch, ending the German advance. A German attack then developed near Polderhoek, whose survivors managed to reach the British infantry and were seen off in bayonet fighting. Observation aircraft found German troops massing against Tower Hamlets, on the Bassevillebeek spur and artillery and machine-gun barrages stopped the attack before it reached the British infantry. At 6:50 p.m. the Germans managed to organise an attack from Tower Hamlets to north of Polygon Wood; such German infantry as got through the barrages were "annihilated" by the British infantry. German counter-attacks were only able to reach the new front line and reinforce the remnants of the front divisions. The 236th Division (Eingreif) attacked south of the Ypres–Roulers railway and 4th Bavarian Division (Eingreif) for 2,000 yd (1,800 m) to the north, with field artillery and twelve aircraft attached to each division and the 234th Division in support.

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From 10 to 16 June the French fired 497,122 shells with less effect than the 265,430 rounds fired from 3 to 9 May. The Germans had managed to fire a heavy artillery barrage of c. 100,000 shells, which stopped the French infantry attack and prevented troops moving up in support. Attempts to repeat the surprise of 9 May by ruses failed and a German counter-barrage had begun in no man's land within two minutes of the French infantry advance. The experience of the attacks on 16 June demonstrated that the effect of counter-battery fire, neutralising fire and changes in the pattern and timing of artillery-fire made no difference if the German wire was uncut when the infantry advance began. German field defences were dug in increasing quantity and complexity during the offensive and German artillery became much more active, as more guns and much more ammunition arrived at the battlefront. A considerable tactical advantage had been gained by the French, who had regained 6 sq mi (16 km2) of ground. The new German defences around the area were on ground overlooked from the Lorette Spur, were more costly to defend and made Vimy Ridge more vulnerable to attack. The apparent lost opportunity on 9 May, when Vimy Ridge was captured in the first rush, led the French army commanders to conclude that more of the same could achieve a breakthrough if better organised, which formed the basis of the planning for the autumn offensives in Artois and Champagne. Pétain wrote that the attack on 9 May showed that a breakthrough was possible and that it could be achieved by careful preparation of communication trenches, jumping-off trenches and assembly positions, if the German defences were carefully reconnoitred and sufficiently bombarded by artillery. Since the defenders could close a gap quickly it would be necessary to maintain momentum, with reserve troops following up the attacking force closely. Attacks in open country were preferable to being bogged down in fighting for obstacles like villages and woods and the attack should be on a broad front, to allow centres of resistance to be outflanked and to disperse German fire power over a wider area. German analysis of the battle was collected in a memorandum of June 1915 and led to renewed emphasis on infantry shelters, deep enough to be invulnerable to heavy artillery and to increase the number of defensive positions behind the front, which would slow an advance and delay subsequent attacks, by forcing the attacker to move artillery into range. On 7 June a copy of Note 5779 was captured on the Artois front and the local corps commander ordered that intensive digging be undertaken and stipulated that reserve positions were to be as solidly built as front line defences.

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During the pause on the ridge crest, an observer reported that the Oosttaverne line was barely occupied, at 2:00 p.m. a balloon observer reported a heavy German barrage on the II Anzac Corps front and a counter-attack patrol aircraft reported German infantry advancing either side of Messines. The German counter-attack was "crushed" by artillery fire by 2:30 p.m. Each corps squadron kept an aircraft on counter-attack patrol all day, to call for barrage fire if German troops were seen in the open but the speed of the British advance resulted in few German counter-attacks. Artillery observers watched for German gunfire and made 398 zone calls but only 165 managed to have German guns engaged. The observers regulated the bombardment of the Oosttaverne line and the artillery of VIII Corps to the north of the attack, which was able to enfilade German artillery opposite X Corps. Fourteen fighters were sent to strafe from low altitude, German ground targets ahead of the British infantry, roving behind German lines, attacking infantry, transport, gun-teams and machine-gun nests; the attacks continued all day, with two of the British aircraft being shot down. Organised attacks were made on the German airfields at Bisseghem and Marcke near Courtrai and the day bombing squadrons attacked airfields at Ramegnies Chin, Coucou, Bisseghem (again) and Rumbeke. Reconnaissance reports of German troops concentrating from Quesnoy–Warneton, led to aircraft setting out to attack them within minutes. German fighters made a considerable effort to intercept corps observation aircraft over the battlefield but were frustrated by patrols on the barrage line and offensive patrols beyond; only one British corps aircraft was shot down by German aircraft during the day. After dark, the night-bombing specialists of 100 Squadron bombed railway stations at Warneton, Menin and Courtrai.

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Surplus field artillery brigade headquarters planned forward moves for the guns and were kept ready to replace casualties. It was expected that much of the artillery would need to switch rapidly from the bombardment plan to engage counter-attacking German infantry. It was planned that the Forward Observation Officers of the divisions in the first attack onto the ridge would control the artillery which had remained in place and the reserve divisions advancing down the far slope to the Oosttaverne line would control the artillery hidden close to the front line and the artillery which advanced into no-man's-land. Franks planned to neutralise German guns within 9,000 yards (8,200 m) of the attack front. On the flanks of the British attack front of 17,000 yards (16,000 m), 169 German guns had been located, for which 42 British guns (25 percent of the German total) were set aside. The 299 German guns in the path of the attack were each to be engaged by a British gun, a formula which required 341 British guns and howitzers to be reserved for counter-battery fire. Every 45 yards (41 m) of front had a medium or heavy howitzer for bombardment, which required 378 guns, with 38 super-heavy guns and howitzers (5 percent) deployed with the field artillery that was due to fire the creeping and standing barrages. Franks devised a bombardment timetable and added arrangements for a massed machine-gun barrage. The 756 medium and heavy guns and howitzers were organised in forty groups and the 1,510 field guns and howitzers in sixty-four field artillery brigades within the attacking divisions and thirty-three Army field artillery brigades, divided among the three attacking corps.

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German infantry found that it was easier for the French to endure preparatory bombardments, since French positions tended to be on dominating ground, not always visible and sparsely occupied. As soon as German infantry attacked, the French positions "came to life" and the troops began machine-gun and rapid fire with field artillery. On 22 April, the Germans had suffered 1,000 casualties and in mid-April, the French fired 26,000 field artillery shells during an attack to the south-east of Fort Douaumont. A few days after taking over at Verdun, Pétain told the air commander, Commandant Charles Tricornot de Rose, to sweep away the German air service and to provide observation for the French artillery. German air superiority was challenged and eventually reversed, using eight-aircraft Escadrilles for artillery-observation, counter-battery and tactical support.

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On 5 July Below reported to Falkenhayn that the new defences were ready and that for the moment the crisis was over. Counter-attacks would not be made until the situation became clear and more Anglo-French attacks were expected. On 6–7 July from Foucaucourt to the Albert–Bapaume road, losses among the German infantry increased rapidly, one crisis merged into the next and the policy of unyielding defence and immediate counter-attack, exposed the defenders to Anglo-French firepower. On the south bank Biaches was lost and at Barleux, Infantry Regiment 89 was subjected to huge amounts of heavy artillery-fire on 9 and 10 July, which demolished trenches and buried soldiers, followed by an infantry attack which was repulsed by the survivors.

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The QF 4.5-inch howitzer was to be used for neutralising German artillery with gas shells, bombarding weaker defences, blocking communication trenches, night barrages and wire-cutting on ground where field guns could not reach. The BL 60 pounder gun was to be used for longer-range barrages and counter-battery fire, the 6-inch Gun for counter-battery fire, neutralisation-fire and wire-cutting using fuze 106. The larger howitzers were reserved for counter-battery fire against well-protected German artillery and the larger guns for long-range fire against targets like road junctions, bridges and headquarters. Co-ordination of artillery was improved by using more telephone exchanges, which put artillery observers in touch with more batteries. Observing stations were built to report to artillery headquarters located at corps headquarters, on the progress of infantry and a corps signals officer was appointed to oversee artillery communication, which had become much more elaborate.

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Charbonneau explained that the defeat of the Colonial Corps was caused by faulty reconnaissance, the ineffectiveness of advanced guards in causing delay to advancing German units and that French offensive tactics neglected the importance of obtaining a superiority of fire, which had led to reckless attacks. The quality of the German opponents was not mentioned but German reconnaissance had been effective, communication between commanders and subordinates had not broken down, mutual support between neighbouring units had occurred and German artillery had provided continuous close fire support. At Neufchâteau, the French colonial infantry had been out-gunned and outnumbered by German units, which had been able to engage all their forces quickly. The French XII Corps had a greater number of guns but was not able to overcome two German infantry battalions. German artillery had engaged the Colonial Brigade from close range but when in a hastily occupied defensive position, the French had nullified much of the German artillery-fire; French troops caught in the open had been annihilated. Both sides had attempted to gain fire superiority before advancing and once this had been achieved by the Germans, they had been able to manoeuvre without severe casualties

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Two small formations of fighters were to fly low patrols, on the far side of the final objective of the Fifth Army, from the beginning of the attack for six hours, to break up German attempts to counter-attack and to stop equivalent German contact-patrols. After six hours, the aircraft were to range further east to attack troop concentrations. Aircraft from the Corps and Army wings were to attack all targets found west of Staden–Dadizeele, with the Ninth Wing taking over east of the line. German aerodromes were attacked periodically and special "ground patrols" were mounted below 3,000 ft (910 m) over the front line, to defend the Corps artillery-observation machines. Attempts to co-ordinate air and ground attacks had mixed results; on the II Corps front, few air attacks were co-ordinated with the infantry and only a vague report was received from an aircraft about a German counter-attack, which was further obscured by a smoke-screen. On the XIX Corps front, despite "ideal" visibility, no warning by aircraft was given of a German counter-attack over the Zonnebeke–St. Julien spur at 9:00 a.m., which was also screened by smoke shell. To the north on the XVIII and XIV Corps fronts, the air effort had more effect, with German strong-points and infantry being attacked on and behind the front. Air operations continued during the night, with more attacks on German airfields and rail junctions. German 4th Army The troops of 169th Brigade of the 56th Division, which tried to follow the leading waves from Glencorse Wood, were stopped at the edge of Polygon Wood and then pushed back by a counter-attack by the German 34th Division around 7:00 a.m., the troops ahead of them being overwhelmed. The brigade was driven back later in the afternoon to its start line, by German attacks from the south and east by troops from a regiment of the 54th Division sent back into the line. The 167th Brigade pulled back its right flank as the 169th Brigade was seen withdrawing through Glencorse Wood and at 3:00 p.m. the Germans attacked the front of 167th Brigade and the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division to the north. The area was under British artillery observation and the German attack was stopped by massed artillery fire.

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Joffre supported the intervention by Foch and also ordered d'Urbal to restrict attacks to piecemeal efforts against local points of tactical importance. Until 15 June the French made many limited attacks on the flanks of the 77th and Moroccan divisions, using the same troops and same tactics. On 23 May the XXI Corps captured the rest of the Lorette Spur and on 27 May the 70th Division took Ablain cemetery, then the sugar refinery on 31 May, which made Souchez vulnerable to an attack from the west as well as the south. The limited narrow-front attacks were much better supported by the artillery. A revised version of Note 5779 was issued on 20 May by GQG, which asserted that the version of 16 April had been vindicated by events. The new version endorsed "continuous battle" and emphasised that reserves must be pushed forward to avoid the mistake made on 9 May, when they had been held back out of German artillery range. An analysis of German defensive methods, described the use of small numbers of infantry equipped with large numbers of machine-guns, firing from flanks and the sheltering of infantry in deep dug-outs, immune to field artillery; French defensive positions were to be modelled on the German practice. Local attacks were resumed but while modestly successful and remaining within the material constraints on the Tenth Army, were hampered by a drastic loss of experience, caused by the extent of French losses. The tempo of limited attacks was beyond the capacity of the Tenth Army to supply and train replacement soldiers according to the requirements of Note 5779. An attempt to return to larger combined attacks by IX, XXI and XXXIII corps from 25 to 26 May failed in most places, because of increases in the capability of the German defence, the impossibility of obtaining surprise and a lack of time to plan operations or to rest troops. Pétain wrote that German barrages were being fired daily, which made infantry attacks almost impossible and that varying French bombardments to obtain surprise made little difference, now that the German artillery had been reinforced and was ready at a moment's notice to begin barrage fire. German guns were registered on no man's land and had only to fire into the area to hit French infantry during an attack. The French counter-battery effort had to wait until German guns revealed themselves and then begin area fire near the German artillery, which was a waste of ammunition.

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Operations to increase British infantry losses in line with the instructions of 22 September were to continue. Gas bombardments of forward British infantry and artillery positions, were to be increased whenever the winds allowed. Every effort was to be made to induce the British to reinforce their forward positions, where the German artillery could engage them.　 Between 26 September and 3 October, the Germans attacked at least 24 times.　 Operation Hohensturm, a bigger German methodical counter-attack, intended to recapture the area around Zonnebeke was planned for 4 October. Battle of the Menin Road Ridge Wounded men at the side of a road after the Battle of Menin Road The British plan for the battle fought from 20–25 September, included more emphasis on the use of heavy and medium artillery to destroy German concrete pill-boxes and machine-gun nests, which were more numerous in the battle zones being attacked and to engage in more counter-battery fire. The British had 575 heavy and medium and 720 field guns and howitzers, having more than doubled the quantity of artillery available at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge.　Aircraft were to be used for systematic air observation of German troop movements, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft crews had been burdened with too many duties and had flown in bad weather.　 On 20 September, the Allies attacked on a 14,500 yards (13,300 m) front and captured most of their objectives, to a depth of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) by mid-morning.　The Germans made many counter-attacks, beginning around 3:00 p.m. until early evening, all of which failed to gain ground or made only a temporary penetration of the new British positions. The German defence had failed to stop a well-prepared attack made in good weather.　 Minor attacks took place after 20 September, as both sides jockeyed for position and reorganised their defences. A mutually-costly attack by the Germans on 25 September, recaptured pillboxes at the south western end of Polygon Wood. Next day, the German positions near the wood were swept away in the Battle of Polygon Wood. Battle of Polygon Wood ポリゴンの森の戦い

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Overall the results of the four-day preliminary artillery bombardment proved unsatisfactory. The Allied fire did not cause severe damage to the Bulgarian and German defensive line while the greater focus of the artillery fire on some points of the line gave a clear indication of the directions where the main attack was to be delivered. The defenders also used every possible moment to repair the damage to their fortifications under the cover of their own artillery. It must also be noted that the Bulgarian and German artillery and its observations posts were practically untouched by the Allied bombardment. While the Bulgarian infantry units suffered 945 casualties during the four day of bombardment, the losses of the artillery were only 10 men killed or wounded and several guns damaged or destroyed. The beginning of the infantry attack was set by the Allied command for 6:30 on 9 of May and as the infantry prepared the artillery resumed its barrage with much greater vigor, once again engulfing the entire defensive line in a cloud of smoke and dust. At precisely 6:30 the Italian, French and Russian infantry moved out of their trenches and advanced against the Bulgarian and German positions along an 11-kilometer long line.The 35th Italian Infantry Division attacked the Bulgarian 2/2 Infantry Brigade and German 201st Infantry Brigade with its Sicilia and Ivrea infantry brigades(61st, 62nd, 161st and 162nd infantry regiments). The focal points of the assault were the powerful positions on Hill 1020 and Hill 1050. To the right parts of the 61st regiment took advantage of the dust cloud, left by the barrage, and managed to capture a forward trench that the Bulgarians had evacuated in order to preserve their infantry from the Allied artillery fire.

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Reserve formations of infantry, artillery, cavalry and tanks were to be made ready behind the Fifth and Second armies, to exploit a successful attack. Gough and Plumer replied over the next couple of days, that they felt that the proposals were premature and that exploitation would not be feasible until Passchendaele ridge had been captured as far as Westroosebeke. Capturing the ridge would probably take two more steps at three-day intervals, followed by another four days to repair roads over the captured ground. Haig explained that although exploitation of the attack due on 10 October was not certain, he desired the arrangements to be made since they could be used at a later date. British offensive preparations Main article: The British set-piece attack in late 1917 The British tactical refinements had sought to undermine the German defence-in-depth, by limiting objectives to a shallower penetration and then fighting the principal battle against Eingreif divisions as they counter-attacked, rather than against the local defenders. By further reorganising the infantry reserves, Plumer had ensured that the depth of the attacking divisions corresponded closer to the depth of the local German counter-attack reserves and their Eingreif divisions, providing more support for the advance and consolidation against German counter-attacks. Divisions attacked on narrower fronts and troops advanced no more than 1,500 yd (1,400 m) into the German defence zone, before consolidating their position. When the Germans counter-attacked, they encountered a reciprocal defence-in-depth, protected by a mass of artillery like the British green and black lines on 31 July and suffered many casualties to little effect. The tempo of the British operations added to the difficulty the Germans had in replacing tired divisions through the transport bottlenecks behind the German front. The Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September, was the first attack with the more limited territorial objectives developed since 31 July, to benefit from the artillery reinforcements brought into the Second Army area and a pause of three weeks for preparation, during which the clouds dispersed and the sun began to dry the ground.

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The German 2nd and 1st armies on the Somme managed a recovery after the string of defeats in September, with fresh divisions to replace exhausted troops and more aircraft, artillery and ammunition diverted from the battle at Verdun and stripped from other parts of the Western Front. Command of the German Air Service (Die Fliegertruppen) was centralised and the new Luftstreitkräfte (German Air Force) was able to challenge Anglo-French air superiority with the reinforcements and new, superior fighter aircraft.

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As contact observers reported the progress of the infantry attack, artillery-observers sent many messages to the British artillery and reported the effect of counter-battery fire on German artillery. Balloon observers used their telephones, to report changes in the German counter-barrage and to direct British artillery on fleeting targets, continuing during the night by observing German gun-flashes. Air reconnaissance during the day, found little movement on the roads and railways behind the German front but the railways at Bapaume were bombed from 5:00 a.m. Flights to Cambrai, Busigny and Etreux later in the day saw no unusual movement and German aircraft attacked the observation aircraft all the way to the targets and back, two Rolands being shot down by the escorts.

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The British set-piece attack in late 1917 The German 4th Army had held on to the Gheluvelt plateau during August in a costly defensive success, which worsened the manpower shortage that the German defensive strategy for 1917 was intended to remedy. Haig transferred command of the offensive to General Plumer, the Second Army commander on 25 August and moved the northern boundary of the Second Army closer to the Ypres–Roulers railway. More heavy artillery was sent to Flanders from the armies further south and placed opposite the Gheluvelt plateau. Plumer continued the development of British attacking methods, which had also taken place in the Fifth Army, during the slow and costly progress in August, against the German defence-in-depth and the unusually wet weather. After a pause of about three weeks, Plumer intended to capture Gheluvelt plateau in four steps, with six days between each step to allow time to bring forward artillery and supplies. Each attack was to have limited geographical objectives like the attacks in August, with infantry brigades re-organised to attack the first objective with one battalion each and the final one with two battalions. Derelict tank used as the roof of a dug out, Zillebeke, 20 September 1917 (Q6416) Plumer arranged for much more medium and heavy artillery to be added to the creeping bombardment, which had been impossible with the amount of artillery available to Gough. The revised attack organisation was intended to have more infantry attacking on narrower fronts, to a shallower depth than the attack of 31 July. The quicker and shorter advances were intended to be consolidated on tactically advantageous ground (particularly on reverse slopes), with the infantry in contact with their artillery and air support, ready to repulse counter-attacks. The faster tempo of the operations was intended to add to German difficulties in replacing tired divisions through the transport bottlenecks behind the German front.

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The artillery situation was only slowly improved by the plan of General Max von Gallwitz, to centralise the command of the remaining artillery for counter-battery fire and to use reinforcements of aircraft to increase the amount of observed artillery fire, which had little effect on Allied air superiority but did eventually increase the accuracy and efficiency of German bombardments. The 2nd Army had been starved of reinforcements in mid-August, to replace exhausted divisions in the 1st Army and plans for a counter-stroke had been abandoned for lack of troops. The emergency in Russia caused by the Brusilov Offensive, the entry of Romania into the war and the French counter offensive at Verdun had already overstretched the German army. General Erich von Falkenhayn the German Chief of the General Staff was dismissed on 29 August 1916 and replaced by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, with First Generalquartiermeister General Ludendorff as his deputy.

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Large numbers of machine-guns were organised to fire offensive and defensive barrages and signal detachments were organised to advance with the infantry. An observation balloon was reserved for messages by signal lamp from the front line, as insurance against the failure of telephone lines and message-runners. The divisional trench mortar batteries were to bombard the German front line opposite the 142nd Brigade, where it was too close for the artillery to shell without endangering British troops. Wire-cutting began in mid-May, against considerable local retaliation by German artillery. At the end of May the two attacking brigades began training at Steenvoorde, on practice courses built to resemble the German positions to be attacked, using air reconnaissance photographs to mark the positions of machine-gun posts and hidden barbed wire. Divisional intelligence summaries were used to plan the capture of German company and battalion headquarters. The 140th Brigade with four tanks attached, was to occupy White Château and the adjacent part of Damstrasse, while the 142nd Brigade attacked the spoil heaps and the canal bank to the left. On 1 June, the British artillery began the intense stage of preparatory bombardment for trench-destruction and wire cutting and the two attacking brigades assembled for the attack from 4–6 June. British fighter aircraft tried to prevent German aircraft observing for their artillery, by dominating the air from the British front line to the German balloon line, about 10,000 yards (9,100 m) beyond. Better aircraft like the Bristol Fighter, S.E.5a and the naval Sopwith Triplane had entered service since Arras and matched the performance of the German Albatros D.III and Halberstadt D.II fighters.

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New smoke shells were fired when the creeping barrage paused beyond each objective, which helped to obscure the British infantry from artillery observers and German machine-gunners far back in the German defensive zone who fired through the British artillery barrages. Around Langemarck, the British infantry formed up close the German positions, too near for the German artillery to fire on for fear of hitting their infantry, although British troops further back at the Steenbeek were severely bombarded. British platoons and sections were allotted objectives and engineers accompanied troops to bridge obstacles and attack strong points. In the 20th Division, each company was reduced to three platoons, two to advance using infiltration tactics and one to mop up areas where the forward platoons had by-passed resistance by attacking from the flanks and from behind. In the II and XIX Corps areas, the foremost infantry had been isolated by German artillery and then driven back by counter-attacks. On 17 August, Gough ordered that the capture of the remainder of their objectives of 16 August would be completed on 25 August. Apart from small areas on the left of the 56th Division (Major-General F. A. Dudgeon), the flanks of the 8th Division and right of the 16th Division, the British had been forced back to their start line by German machine-gun fire from the flanks and infantry counter-attacks supported by plentiful artillery. Attempts by the German infantry to advance further were stopped by British artillery-fire, which inflicted many losses. Dudgeon reported that there had been a lack of time to prepare the attack and study the ground, since the 167th Brigade had relieved part of the 25th Division after it had only been in the line for 24 hours; neither unit had sufficient time to make preparations for the attack. Dudgeon also reported that no tracks had been laid beyond Château Wood, that the wet ground had slowed the delivery of supplies to the front line and obstructed the advance beyond it. Pillboxes had caused more delays and subjected the attacking troops to frequent enfilade fire.

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Communication between the infantry and artillery was established with runners, messenger dogs and pigeons. Wireless transmitters and power buzzers were set up at brigade headquarters and artillery observation posts, one for each artillery group. Engineer and pioneer units began to dig in telephone lines, which took until the afternoon of 21 September. Air operations Observing and reporting on German counter-attack movements was made a duty for all aircraft and patrol areas were given to II and V Brigades and the Ninth Wing to observe. "Hostile Tactical Maps" were issued, showing German assembly points and the likely routes to them and towards the front line. The II Brigade covered the Second Army front east to the Roulers–Menin railway. The area was divided into three sectors, each with a counter-attack patrol of two fighters, maintained for eight hours after "zero-hour", flying below 500 ft (150 m) and using the special maps, to attack any German units they caught on the move and to drive off German low-flying aircraft. On return they were to telephone a report direct to the Second Army Report Centre at Locre, similar arrangements being made for the Fifth Army. Ninth Wing aircraft were to patrol at low altitude east of Zarren–Oostnieukerke–Menin, beginning two hours after the start of the attack, to harass German reinforcements. Corps squadrons were to maintain counter-attack patrols on their Corps fronts, calling for immediate artillery fire and warning British infantry by smoke signal. Not all of these measures were possible on the day due to the weather, because it had rained on 19 September and was misty next morning but air operations commenced as soon as the mist cleared at 8.00 a.m. German aircraft attempting to intervene during the battle suffered from the presence of anti-aircraft guns near the front line and a Lewis gunner of a pioneer battalion in the 19th Division, shot down a German aircraft in flames at 1:30 p.m.; the feat was repeated next day and several German formations were broken up by ground fire.

British Commander's Recommendations for Advancing Troops

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