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質問

They accordingly allotted their resources, equally divided, in a defensive posture to fortify the approaches to Ioannina, capital of Epirus, and the mountain passes leading from Thessaly to Macedonia. This was a grave error. The war plan by Venizelos and the Greek General Staff called for a rapid advance with overwhelming force towards Thessaloniki with its important harbor. A small Greek force of little more than a division, just enough to forestall a possible Turkish redeployment eastwards, was to be sent west as the "Army of Epirus". At the same time the bulk of the Greek infantry and artillery made a rapid advance against the Turks in the east. In the event, the Greek plan worked well. Advancing on foot, the Greeks soundly defeated the Turks twice, and were in Thessaloniki within 4 weeks. The Greek plan for overwhelming attack and speedy advance hinged upon another factor: should the Greek Navy succeed in blockading the Turkish fleet within the Straits, any Turkish reinforcements from Asia would have no way of quickly reaching Europe. Turkey would be slow to mobilize, and even when the masses of troops raised in Asia were ready, they were able to go no further than the outskirts of Constantinople, fighting the Bulgarians in brutal trench warfare. With the Bulgarians directing the bulk of their force towards Constantinople, the capture of Thessaloniki would ensure that the railway axis between these two main cities was lost to the Turks, causing loss of logistics and supplies and severe impairment of command and control capability. The Turks would be hard placed to recruit locals, as their loyalties would be liable to lie with the Balkan Allies. Ottoman armies in Europe would be quickly cut off and their loss of morale and operational capability would lead them toward a quick surrender.

回答No.1

Nakay702 · ベストアンサー

＞They accordingly allotted their resources, equally divided, in a defensive posture to fortify the approaches to Ioannina, capital of Epirus, and the mountain passes leading from Thessaly to Macedonia. This was a grave error. The war plan by Venizelos and the Greek General Staff called for a rapid advance with overwhelming force towards Thessaloniki with its important harbor.
⇒それゆえ彼らは（オスマントルコ軍のギリシア攻撃計画が先行していたのでギリシア軍は）、ロアニナへの接近路、エピルスの首都とテッサリアからマケドニアまで通じる山道の守備を固めるために、防御の姿勢で（人的・物的）資源を等しく分けて割り当てた。これは、重大な失策であった。ベニゼロスとギリシア軍の参謀幕僚による戦争計画は、重要な港のあるテッサロニキの方へ圧倒的力で迅速な前進を必要としたのである。

＞A small Greek force of little more than a division, just enough to forestall a possible Turkish redeployment eastwards, was to be sent west as the "Army of Epirus". At the same time the bulk of the Greek infantry and artillery made a rapid advance against the Turks in the east. In the event, the Greek plan worked well. Advancing on foot, the Greeks soundly defeated the Turks twice, and were in Thessaloniki within 4 weeks.
⇒1個師団より小さなギリシア軍団でも、トルコ軍の東方への移動に前もって対処するのに十分なので、それが「エピルスの方面軍」として西に送られた。同時に、大半のギリシア歩兵連隊と砲兵隊が、東部でトルコ軍に対して迅速に進軍した。この場合は結局、ギリシア軍の計画はうまくいった。徒歩で進んで、ギリシア軍はしっかり2回トルコ軍を破って、4週以内にテッサロニキに入った。

＞The Greek plan for overwhelming attack and speedy advance hinged upon another factor: should the Greek Navy succeed in blockading the Turkish fleet within the Straits, any Turkish reinforcements from Asia would have no way of quickly reaching Europe. Turkey would be slow to mobilize, and even when the masses of troops raised in Asia were ready, they were able to go no further than the outskirts of Constantinople, fighting the Bulgarians in brutal trench warfare.
⇒圧倒的攻撃と速やかな進軍のギリシア軍計画が、もう一つの要因に基づいて決まった。すなわち、ギリシア海軍が海峡の中でトルコ艦隊を遮断することに成功すれば、アジアからのいかなるトルコ軍増援もヨーロッパに速やかに到着する術がなくなる、と言うことである。トルコ軍は動員するのに手間取ることになるだろうし、そして、アジアで蜂起する軍隊を多数準備できたときでも、彼らは（まずは）厳しい塹壕戦でブルガリア軍と戦うことになるので、コンスタンチノープルの郊外より遠くへは少しも行けないはずであった。

＞With the Bulgarians directing the bulk of their force towards Constantinople, the capture of Thessaloniki would ensure that the railway axis between these two main cities was lost to the Turks, causing loss of logistics and supplies and severe impairment of command and control capability. The Turks would be hard placed to recruit locals, as their loyalties would be liable to lie with the Balkan Allies. Ottoman armies in Europe would be quickly cut off and their loss of morale and operational capability would lead them toward a quick surrender.
⇒もしブルガリア軍がコンスタンチノープルに大半の軍力を差し向けると、テッサロニキの攻略はこれらの2つの主要都市の間の鉄道軸がトルコ軍に対して失われたことを確実にして、兵站部や供給路の損失と指揮支配能力の厳しい減退を引き起こすだろう。トルコ軍は、忠誠心をバルカン同盟国と共有する傾向の強いこの地域では、地元の兵士を募るには極めて厳しい場面に置かれることになる。ヨーロッパのオスマントルコ軍は早々に孤立して、士気と作戦行動上の能力の喪失によって、早晩降伏する方向をたどることになるだろう。

お礼

回答ありがとうございました。